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ee Accidental"

Shootings as Fourth
Amendment Seizures
By

KATHRYN

R. URBONYA*

After viewing the outrageous beating of Rodney King and after repeatedly reading of police officers "accidentally" firing their guns and
killing suspects, the public has begun questioning the manner in which
police officers arrest suspects. 1 Central to this inquiry is the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,2 which prohibits unreasonable seizures. 3 In the civil rights case brought by Mr. King, the focus
• Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Fonner law clerk for United States District Judge G. Ernest Tidwell, Atlanta, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme Court Justice
Gerald W. VandeWalle. The author wishes to thank Geoffrey Alpert, Wayne LaFave, Paul
Marcus, and John Warner for their incisive comments on early drafts of this article. The
author would also like to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Debra Green and
John Connolly, law students at Georgia State University, and by the College of Law through
its research grant.
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Law Enforcement: Implications ofthe Rodney King
Beating, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 469, 411 (1992) ("The not-guilty verdicts in [the Rodney King
case] shocked the American public. . . . Although the deaths, injuries, and destruction to
property can be counted, • . . the immediate damage to the social fabric of this country is
immeasurable."); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 501 (1992) ("As long as the courts and both federal and state government treat police abuse as a series of isolated incidents, or as a regrettable by-product of the
war on crime, the . . . Rodney Kings will continue to pay an unconscionable price for our
misguided policies."); Charles Strum, Newark Police Start Plan With Safe Streets the Goal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at B4, C1 (Newark adopted a plan to put police officers on foot
patrol after recent police shootings at teenagers involved in stealing automobiles resulted in
numerous deaths.).
2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The Amendment provides in part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ...." Id. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Wolfv. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution held to be inadmissible in a state court).
3. The Supreme Court has determined that three amendments of the United States Constitution protect an individual's constitutional right to personal security: the Fourth Amendment applies to individuals who have been "seized" by the use of "unreasonable" force;
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985); the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees who have been subject to "excessive force
that amounts to punishment"; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.lO; and the Eighth Amendment
applies to prisoners who have been subject to the "malicious" use of force; Hudson v. McMil[337]
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has been on the reasonableness of beating him.4 In stark comparison,
some courts have failed to scrutinize the reasonableness of police officers
shooting suspects because they have determined that the Fourth Amendment was not even applicable. 5 After considering the circumstances of
the shootings, they held that the shootings were "accidents," not Fourth
Amendment "seizures." 6 These decisions fail to understand the role of
the Fourth Amendment. This failure has been in part engendered by the
United States Supreme Court's difficulty in defining what conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure."7 For example, the Supreme Court
has articulated three definitions of Fourth Amendment "seizures,''8 has
lian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998-99 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). The focus of this Article is on the right
to personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment.
4. See, e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 1, at 473 ("The City of Los Angeles and its police
department, as well as individual officers, each [sic] faces astronomical civil judgments.").
5. See generally text accompanying notes 156-214.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 164-92 for a discussion of these cases.
In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to "the accidental effects of otherwise lawful governmental conduct." Id. at 596. See infra text accompanying notes 77-91 for a discussion of this case. The word "accident," like the word "seizure," however, is not self-defining.
If a court were to interpret broadly the word "accident," it could apply to all action in
which no harm was specifically intended. This broad reading, however, is even inconsistent
with the Court's narrowest "seizure" definition, which it specified in Brower. I d. at 599. In
Brower the Court did not interpret the word "seizure" to require a specific intent to harm. !d.
It found that a "seizure" occurs if a person was "stopped by the very instrumentality set in
motion or put in place in order to achieve that result." Id.
A narrow interpretation of the word "accident" would encompass only negligent conduct.
In Brower the Court used examples of negligent conduct to show that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply. Id. at 596-97.
In short, the statement that the shooting was an "accident" for some courts constitutes a
conclusion, not a mere description of conduct. Interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment has historically involved balancing of interests, not an exegesis of the text of the amendment. See infra notes 35,45-47, 51-55, 73 and accompanying text. The purpose of this Article
is to focus on the conduct that precedes the shooting to show that the Fourth Amendment may
be implicated prior to the shooting, however a court labels the shooting.
7. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 20 (1988) ("[T]here is virtual unanimity, transcending
normal ideological dispute, that the Court has simply has made a mess of search and seizure
law."). This article focuses on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of a person,
not of an object. See generally Wayne LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: A Bicentennial
"Checkup," 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 223, 227 (1991) ("[T]he Court's definition of what constitutes
a seizure of an object has been more straightforward and less controversial: 'some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in ... property.'") (quoting United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S 109, 113 (1984)). Even with a clearer definition of what constitutes
"seizure" of property, the Court in the 1992 Term will determine if the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals erred in determining that state officials did not "seize" a person's mobile home
when they disconnected it and towed it away from its lot. Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d
1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 1290 (1992).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 29-92.
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used different approaches to justify its interpretations, 9 and has repeatedly warned that an application of one of its definitions was limited to the
facts of the particular case. 10
The Court has not clarified the relationship among the three
"seizure" definitions. In Terry v. Ohio, 11 the Court questioned whether
"the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen." 12 In United States v. Mendenhall, 13 the Court asked whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave." 14 The Mendenhall definition, however, the Court
recently modified in Florida v. Bostick. 15 It explained that the "free to
leave" concept of Mendenhall is inapplicable when police officers question bus passengers at a layover stop. 16 It explained that the modified
Mendenhall definition focuses on "whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."17 In contrast to the Mendenhall definition, which focuses on a
reasonable person's response to the assertion of authority, the Court in
Brower v. County of lnyo 18 stated a third "seizure" definition, which focuses on an officer's intent to assert authority. It declared that a
"seizure" occurs when there is "a governmental termination of freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied." 19 Although all the
9. See infra text accompanying notes 34, 45-47, 51-55, 77-82.
10. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (prior "seizure" definition is
inapplicable and must be modified to the facts of the case); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 596-600 (1989) (majority opinion never mentions prior "seizure" definitions as it articulates a new definition); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (definition of Fourth
Amendment "seizure" is "necessarily imprecise" because "what constitutes a restraint on liberty .•. will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting
in which the conduct occurs"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("We thus decide
nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less
than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.") See infra
text accompanying notes 29-92 for a discussion of the Court's three "seizure" definitions.
11. 392 u.s. 1 (1968).
12. Id. at 19 n.16; see infra text accompanying notes 36-47 for a discussion of this
definition.
13. 446 u.s. 544 (1980).
14. Id. at 554. (opinion of Stewart, J. and Rehnquist, J.); see also INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 215 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 48-76 for a discussion of this
definition.
15. Ill s. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1992).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 489 u.s. 593 (1989).
19. Id. at 597 (emphasis in original). See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this definition.
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definitions require an obvious assertion of authority,Z0 the last one also
requires the "intentional" use of force. 21 In analyzing police shootings,
courts thus need to determine whether they must apply all of the definitions, choose one that was articulated in a case with the most analogous
facts, or craft a new definition for its particular facts.
In determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure,
courts may also scrutinize the justifications the Court has given for its
definitions. Although most Supreme Court decisions attempt to give
meaning to the history of the Fourth Amendment,22 they reveal differences in emphasis. In deriving the Terry 23 and MendenhalP4 broad definitions, the Court emphasized balancing: it balanced the need to subject
the police practices to constitutional scrutiny against the state's interest
in effective law enforcement. In its significantly narrower decision in
Brower25 and its recent application of the prior definitions, 26 the Court
has found guidance from dictionaries and the common law in interpreting a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 27 The Court's recent decisions reflect a movement to narrow drastically the Court's scrutiny of various
police practices.28
20. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44, 66-72 for a discussion of the two categories
of force created by the Supreme Court-a "show of authority" and physical force.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 136-40 for a discussion of "intentional" use of
force.
22. See, e.g., Brower v. County oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (the Fourth Amendment
was a rejection of the use of writs of assistance and general warrants by English officials.).
23. Terry, 392 U.S at 18 n.15 ("[T]he sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security," (rather
than to rely on an "overly technical definition").
24. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 ("[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a 'seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth
Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate
law enforcement practices.").
·
25. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (Intentional conduct is "implicit in the word 'seizure,' which
can hardly be applied to an unknowing act.").
26. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75, 325-54 for a discussion of reliance on dictionaries and the common law.
28. The Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (1991) suggested
that sweeps of buses for drugs did not constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure." See infra
text accompanying notes 60-65 for a discussion of this case. Commentators have vehemently
condemned the Court's narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wayne R.
LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment
''Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 729, 752 (The Court's decision in Bostick indicates "that
lower courts are not to interfere with bus sweep procedures."); Tracey Maclin, Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 11 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 800
(1992) ("The Court's blind acceptance of police power produces distorted standards, ignores
the real world, and destroys Fourth Amendment freedoms under the guise oflaw enforcement
interests."); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
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As a result of having three "seizure" definitions, different ap-

proaches to defining Fourth Amendment "seizures," and the contextspecific nature of any application of the definitions by the Supreme
Court, how a particular court resolves the issue whether a police officer
seized an individual by shooting implicitly depends upon its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
This article contends that when police officers shoot at an individual
during an investigation or attempted arrest they have effected a Fourth
Amendment seizure. The justification for this view is largely derived
from balancing the need to subject a police practice to constitutional
scrutiny against the state's interest in law enforcement. Part I details the
development of the "seizure" definitions by the Supreme Court.
Although the Rehnquist Court appears to look to dictionaries and the
common law for easy answers, Part I reveals that balancing has been
implicit in all of its decisions regarding what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure." Part II specifies some common shooting situations that police officers encounter. It reveals that whether a court determines that an individual has been seized depends upon which definition it
applies and also how it interprets Brower's requirement that police ofREv. 1, 80 n.262 (1991) (In suggesting that no "seizure" occurred during a bus sweep, "the
Court was wrong in both result and rationale.").
In California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551-52 (1991), the Supreme Court also
determined that a police officer's footchase of a suspect did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 66-76 for a discussion of this case; see also LaFave,
supra at 762 (The Court "unwisely and unnecessarily permit[s] the police to make serious
intrusions upon the liberty and freedom of action of citizens without the need to offer even a
modicum of justification."); Maclin, supra, at 751 ("[T]he police rather than the individual is
[sic] now sovereign on the streets of America."); Hamida Abdal-Khallaq, Comment, Precedent
for Hodari in Modem Supreme Court Cases-Does It Exist? An Analysis of California v.
Hodari, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 171, 172 (1991) (The Court furthers the goal of law enforcement by sacrificing "our fundamental right to Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures ....").
The Court's decision in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989), similarly
restricts the application of the Fourth Amendment by requiring officers to act intentionally
when apprehending suspects. See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this
case; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police
Chase Cases, 58 TENN. L. REv. 73, 115 (1990) (The court ignored society's interest in personal
liberty as it pondered "far-fetched hypotheticals and formalistic concepts of causation and
means intentionally applied."); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1313 (1990) ("Fourth Amendment protection should not depend on such slippery and deceptive conclusions about the presence of official intent, or whether official conduct resulted in acquiring physical control over a
suspect."); Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition ofa Seizure: What
is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 619, 647 (1990) ("Because the Brower test does not recognize the significance of intimidating or coercive shows of authority, the test fails to properly balance individual and governmental interests.").
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fleers act intentionally. Part III briefly describes the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It contends that the Fourth
Amendment is the proper amendment under which to analyze police
shootings. Parts IV proposes that the Court should adhere to its original
definition in Terry-was there a "show of authority"-in evaluating
whether an individual was seized. Part V argues that the balance should
be struck in favor of constitutional scrutiny of the police practice under
the Fourth Amendment. The appropriate place to show greater concern
for the law enforcement interest is in the reasonableness prong of the
Fourth Amendment.29

I. The Court's Approach to Creating Three Definitions of
Fourth Amendment "Seizures"
Determining when police officers have "seized" an individual within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has been a difficult task for the
United States Supreme Court. During an eight-year period, from 1983 to
1991, the Court has issued six opinions on the scope of Fourth Amendment seizures. 30 The Court's last three opinions unmistakably indicate a
significant narrowing of the definition. 31 Even though lower courts can
easily perceive the Court's direction, they face the task of applying three
seizure definitions to shootings by police. 32 Analysis of these decisions
indicates the morass the Court has created: whether an individual was
"seized" depends upon which definition a court selects. 33 The problem is
also exacerbated by the Court's failure to clarify how one should interpret the Fourth Amendment. 34 The Court's jurisprudence has involved
29. See infra text accompanying notes 361-68.
30. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547
(1991); Brower v. County oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567
(1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 28, at 645 ("[T]he Brower test is in direct conflict with the
reasonable person analysis," which was the Court's prior standard.); LaFave, supra note 28, at
734 (In the Hodari D. and Bostick decisions the Supreme Court failed to find a Fourth Amendment "seizure" even though under its prior definitions a "seizure" definitely occurred.);
Maclin, supra note 28, at 1314 (A rule requiring a pursued suspect to stop in order to implicate
the Fourth Amendment "would fasten the final nail in the coffin for the right of locomotion.").
32. See infra text accompanying notes 36-92 for a discussion of the Court's three seizure
definitions.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 156-258 for a discussion of the conflicting results
lower courts have reached in applying the Court's seizure definitions to shootings by police
officers.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44, 48-50, 78-82 for a discussion of the different
approaches the Court has used in defining Fourth Amendment "seizures."

Winter 1993]

SHOOTINGS AS FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES

343

both balancing and the creation of "rigid" rules. 35
A. The Terry Definition

The concept of an investigatory stop was first defined in Terry v.
Ohio, 36 the Court's classic stop and frisk case. In determining whether
such a stop was a Fourth Amendment "seizure" and whether a frisk was
a Fourth Amendment "search, the Court evaluated the intrusiveness of
the law enforcement practice upon an individual's interest in personal
security. 37 In Terry, a police officer watched individuals walk back and
forth past a store many times. 38 Suspecting that they were going to rob
the store, the officer approached them, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. 39 When Terry mumbled a response, the
officer grabbed him. 40 The Supreme Court determined that the officer
had seized Terry when he grabbed him. 41 In a footnote, the Court articulated two types of compulsion officers employ in seizing individuals:
"physical force" and a "show of authority."42 The Court stated, "Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' occurred." 43 Because the grabbing constituted a clear seizure by
the use of physical force, the Court found it unnecessary to determine if
the police officer had effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure" by an assertion of authority before he grabbed Terry.44
The Court justified its definition by balancing "the sanctity of the
person" with the state's interest in law enforcement.45 One significant
factor it used in striking the balance in favor of the right to personal
35. See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 22 (The Court has failed to explain
why, when it is addressing Fourth Amendment issues, it sometimes uses balancing and sometimes uses "rigid" rules.).
36. 392 u.s. 1 (1968).
37. /d. at 16-18.
38. /d. at 6.
39. /d. at 6-7.
40. /d. at 7.
41. /d. at 19.
42. /d. at 19 n.16.
43. /d.
44. /d.
45. /d. at 16-19. In determining whether an investigatory stop and frisk implicated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court first noted that each person has an interest in being " 'free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' "
/d. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The Court determined that an investigatory stop does not infringe upon this right if it is based upon reasonable
suspicion, given the weight of the government's interest in law enforcement and the limited
intrusion upon the right to personal security. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-30. Because the Court did
not label the stop a "de minimis" intrusion outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, it
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security was "the degree of community resentment aroused by particular
practices . . . ." 46 In short, the Court refused "to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and
the citizen."47
B. The Mendenhall Definition
The Court articulated its second "seizure" definition in United
States v. Mendenhal/. 48 In this case the Court attempted to clarify
Terry's "show of authority" prong by determining that a "seizure" occurs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." 49 It declared that the following factors were relevant to that issue: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by an officer, some physical touching of the person . . ., or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled." 50 It did not, however, indicate how to
weigh these factors.
As with the Terry definition, the Court's second definition of a
"seizure" in Mendenhall was based on balancing the interests of personal
security against the state's interest in law enforcement. 5 1 Under this definition, however, the Court sought to limit the broad reach of Terry by
distinguishing stops which are Fourth Amendment "seizures" from consensual encounters52 which are not "seizures." Encounters, the Court
affirmed the importance of the right to personal security and of subjecting police practice to
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 16-17.
46. Id. at 17 n.14.
47. Id. at 17.
48. 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
49. Id. at 554.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 553-54. The right to personal security, however, need not always be considered
solely in opposition to the state's interest in law enforcement. Sometimes the Court characterizes the right to personal security as a part of the state's interest in law enforcement. In Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, the Court placed both interests on the same side of the balance scale.
It explained that "the security of all would be diminished" if police officers were not able to
conduct investigations to identify those who are guilty of wrongdoing. I d. at 554 (quoting
Hayres v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 503 (1963)). Professors Silas Wasserstrom and Michael
Seidman have also noted this false conflict. See supra Wasserstrom & Seidman, note 7, at 65.
They surmise that a resident of a crime-ridden area would welcome a law enforcement program that would include "aggressive patrolling or random, warrantless searches and arrests
...." Id. at 65-66. In this situation, an interest in personal security is present on both sides of
the balance: the person subject to the program has an interest in personal security, but so does
the person who lives in the high-crime neighborhood.
52. Id. at 555-56. The Court stated that if the contact was "otherwise inoffensive" then
no "seizure" occurred. Id. at 555. The dichotomy between an encounter and a Fourth
Amendment stop, however, is apparent to the Court, not to lower courts and scholars. Com-
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explained, allow police officers to ask citizens questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment. As long as a person "remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion on that
person's liberty or privacy . . . ." 53 In declaring that consensual encounters do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, the Court again balanced interests, but this time determined that the state's interest was
"legitimate" and that the individual had no interest in being free from
questions. 5 4 The Mendenhall Court declared that characterizing all police/citizen encounters as seizures under the Fourth Amendment "would
impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate
law enforcement practices." 55
The Mendenhall definition of a seizure and the Court's subsequent
applications of it, however, have been widely criticized as wholly unrealistic. 56 If the Mendenhall definition were literally interpreted, most exchanges between police officers and citizens would constitute Fourth
Amendment "seizures" because most individuals confronted with questioning by police officers do not "feel free to leave." In applying the
Mendenhall definition, the Court has nevertheless determined that most
questioning is consensual.
In attempting to understand the Court's perplexing applications of
the Mendenhall definition, Professor Wayne LaFave has stated that the
reasonable person that the Court envisions has incredibly thick skin,
making it possible to resist the obvious assertion of authority by police
pare State v. Gerrish, 815 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Or. 1991) (quoting State v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28,
34 (Or. 1991)) (Stopping at a roadblock was not a "seizure" because a roadblock is like" 'tapping [a] citizen on the shoulder at the outset to get a citizen's attention'.") and In re Gissette,
Angela P., 1992 WL 148206, leave to appeal granted, 581 N.Y.S. 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(juvenile was not seized by officer asking numerous and demanding questions on a bus where
there was limited or no movement allowed) with Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th
Cir. 1985) (roadblock constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure) and United States v. Wilson,
953 F.2d 116, 123 (4th Cir. 1991) (officer seized suspect by walking alongside him, repeatedly
asking permission to search coat).
53. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
54. Id. at 554-55.
55. Id. at 554.
56. See, e.g., Tracy Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1303 (1990). Professor Maclin incisively summarizes the problems with the Court's second definition:
It is unrealistic because few, if any, citizens will resist an officer's demands. It is
unfair because it adopts the police officer's perspective, rather than the citizen's, in
judging the constitutional validity of police invasions. After all, the Fourth Amendment speaks of the rights of the people, not of the police.

I d.
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officers57 • Only such a person could perceive that there was freedom to
.leave. For example, in INS. v. Delgado58 the Supreme Court held that
Hispanic factory workers were not seized when some immigration agents
stationed themselves at exits as other agents, armed with walkie-talkies
and weapons, displayed their badges as they roamed about the factory
asking questions. 59 Similarly, in Florida v. Bostick, 60 the Supreme Court
implied that the lower court, on remand, should determine that an Mrican-American bus passenger, who was at a layover stop, was not seized
by two police officers, who had badges and carried a gun in a "recognizable zipper pouch," as they questioned the passenger. 61 Even though the
passenger allowed the officer to inspect his ticket and identification, the
police then asked to inspect his luggage as one of the officer's blocked his
path to exit the bus. 62 The Supreme Court stated that understanding the
Mendenhall definition requires sensitivity to the facts of the particular
case. 63 It explained, "the 'free to leave' analysis . . . is inapplicable." 64
"In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests ...." 65 These interpretations of the Mendenhall definition may also suggest that the
reasonable person that the Supreme Court envisions implicitly knows of
her right to walk away or to terminate questioning and has faith in the
integrity of the police, traits certainly not possessed by many minority
suspects.
In California v. Hodari D., 66 although the Court similarly narrowed
the Terry/Mendenhall definition of what constitutes a "show of authority" restricting a reasonable person's liberty, the Court nevertheless expanded what type of physical force constitutes a "seizure" under its prior
Terry definition. 67 InHodari D., the Court declared that the Mendenhall
definition merely states a "necessary but not sufficient condition for
seizure.'' 68 The Court ruled that a Terry/Mendenhall "show of author57. See LaFave, supra note 28, at 734-740 ("The Court finds a perceived freedom to depart in circumstances when only the most thick-skinned of suspects would think such a choice
was open them.").
58. 466 u.s. 210 (1984).
59. Id. at 212, 219.
60. 111 s. Ct. 2382 (1991).
61. Id. at 2387-88.
62. Id. at 2385.
63. Id. at 2386-87.
64. Id. at 2387.
65. Id.
66. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991).
67. ld. at 1550.
68. ld. at 1551. Under this approach, the Court can drastically limit the doctrine of stare
decisis by merely declaring prior cases did not articulate all the requirements necessary to
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ity" is insufficient; there must also be compliance with the shown authority.69 In dicta, however, the Court explained that if officers use physical
force, voluntary compliance is not necessary. 70 The Court broadly
stated, "To constitute an arrest ... the mere grasping or application of
physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, [is] sufficient."71 It thus added two bright-line rules
to a fuzzy definition: if an individual does not stop then there is no
seizure even if there was a "show of authority," but if officers use physical force, then voluntary compliance is not necessary. Therefore, even if
a footchase constitutes a "show of authority," no seizure occurs until the
individual stops. 72
In crafting this limitation, the Hodari Court not only balanced inter73
ests, but it also found guidance from dictionaries74 and some aspects of
fulfill a particular legal standard. In short, this practice would allow the court to change wellestablished law without requiring reasons for doing so.
69. /d. at 1550-51.
70. /d. at 1551.
71. ld at 1550.
72. /d. at 1552.
73. /d. at 1551. The Court stated, "We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter,
to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest ..•.
Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and compliance with police orders to stop
should therefore be encouraged." /d. Even though the Court's interpretation of the role of
language in constitutional adjudication is naive, balancing is similarly subject to manipulation
based on personal preferences. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1989) (Judges should favor general rules to balancing tests
because the latter compels judges to act more like "fact-finders [rather] than as expositors of
the law."); Maclin, supra note 28, at 1303 ("[T]he inevitable result of [F]ourth [A]mendment
jurisprudence keyed to balancing or sound social policy is to 'give the police the upper hand'.")
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
74. See 111 S. Ct. at 1549 (1992) ("From the time of the founding to the present, the word
'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession'.•. .")(citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY
510 (6th ed. 1856); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2057 (1981). See
generally Scalia, supra note 73, at 1184.
In this recent article, Justice Scalia, the author of Hodari D., stated that the task of deriving general rules is perhaps easier for him than for other judges because he is "more inclined to
adhere closely to the plain meaning of a text." /d. He explained that this was his approach for
determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." /d. To illustrate his approach,
he cited his concurring opinion in Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In Chesternut,
the Court determined that police officers had not seized a suspect by following him in a cruiser.
486 U.S. at 574-75. The majority opinion refused to adopt two proposed bright-line rules: a
suspect must stop before a seizure can occur, or that all chases are Fourth Amendment
seizures. /d. at 572-73. In the concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice
Kennedy's adoption of the first proposed bright-line rule-a "seizure" does not occur until the
suspect actually stops, the view later adopted in Hodari D. /d. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia in his article maintained that his approach to determining what consti-
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the common law.75 The Court's dictum-that the use of any physical
force that actually touches an individual would constitute a "seizure"appears in conflict with its third "seizure" definition, articulated just
three years before in Brower v. County of lnyo. 76
C. The Brower Definition

The confusion about the relationship among the Court's "seizure"
definitions is apparent in Brower v. County oflnyo. 77 In Brower, the majority opinion not only articulated a third definition78 without ever mentioning its prior definitions, but it implicitly balanced the parties' interest
as it attempted to distinguish a constitutional tort under the Fourth
Amendment from an ordinary state tort. 79 Its explicit vehicle for narrowing the scope of the constitutional tort was its interpretation of the
word "seizure." The Court explained that only intentional conduct can
create a Fourth Amendment "seizure" because the word "seizure" "can
tutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is much better than the Court's imprecise test of
examining all of the circumstances to ascertain if the police conduct was coercive.
Many scholars, however, do not accept textual analysis with the same confidence as Justice Scalia does. See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 80 (1990) (A textual argument
is actually "an appeal to values and morality."); Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town:
An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38
KAN. L. REv. 815, 860-61 (1990) (Conventionalism "teaches that there is no transcendently
right interpretive practice [and] that we cannot step outside our own interpretative community
to judge its conventions.'"); Wasserstrom and Seidman, supra note 7, at 54 n.140 ("[I]t is not
possible to generate a determinate body of rules governing searches and seizures from a simple
reading of the constitutional text"); Note, The Dictionary and the Law, J. LEGAL Hisr. 389,
391 (1989) (A dictionary is not the source to resolve legal disputes.).
75. See, e.g., Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3 (Common law "defines the limits of a
seizure of the person.") In Hodari D. the Supreme Court selectively used the common law to
interpret the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1150-51. It rejected using the common law on attempted arrest, but adopted the common law as it applied to actual arrests. Id. It failed to
explain not only why the common law was significant, but also why it selectively chose certain
aspects ofit to shed light on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." See, e.g., Kathy
R. Mahrt, Note, Seizure and the Fourth Amendment: The Meaning and Implications of California v. Hodari, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 213, 231 (1991) ("Our interpretation of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment as it has grown over the last twenty-five years should define the scope of a
seizure, not the common law of arrest."); see infra text accompanying notes 339-43 for a discussion of the Court's inconsistent application of the common law to Fourth Amendment
issues.
76. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this

case.

77. 489 u.s. 593 (1989).
78. Id. at 596-97. A "seizure" occurs under the third definition "whenever there is a
governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement ... through means
intentionally applied." I d. (emphasis in original).
79. I d. at 596. A state tort occurs, according to the Court, if "a parked and unoccupied
police car slips its brake" and injures someone. Id.
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hardly be applied to an unknowing act." 80 It thus created a dichotomy
for analyzing the display of force by police officers: whether there a "misuse of power" 81 or just an "accident."82
The Court derived this dichotomy by considering only the two extremes of conduct-negligence and intentional acts. 83 In Brower, the
Court held that police officers had seized a pursued driver by intentionally setting up a roadblock on a curve that stopped the pursued individual by killing him. 84 It contrasted this clear intentional conduct with
negligent behavior. 85 The Court explained that if police officers accidentally pin a serial killer against a wall with their cruiser, there would be no
Fourth Amendment seizure. 86 If, however, the officers intentionally
"sideswipe[]" a fleeing car, causing a crash, then there would be a
seizure. 87 The Court's definition of "intentional" conduct focuses attention on the intent to stop a suspect, not the intent to harm a person. 88
The Court explained that intentional conduct should be measured objectively by focusing on the means used to stop a suspect. 89 A seizure occurs if a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or
put in place in order to achieve that result." 90 This clarification, the
Court stated, was necessary because otherwise it would "be driven to
saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by the accidental
discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by
a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg."91 The Court thus
impliedly defines objective intent as the desire to bring about the stated
physical consequence of stopping, not of a particular physical harm.
The significance of this third definition is unclear. Since the Brower
decision, some courts have interpreted Brower to require an intent to
cause a particular harm, not the intent to cause a suspect to stop. 92 The
confusion arising from the Brower definition is understandable. Brower
raises questions as to the significance of police officers' drawing their
weapons and using them. Analysis of common situations resulting in
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id. (quoting Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 596-97.
84. Id. at 599-600.
85. Id. at 596-97.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 597.
88. Id. at 599.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 599.
91. Id at 598-99 (emphasis added). The Court explained that a court should not "draw
too fine a line" in examining the means used to cause a suspect to stop. Id at 598.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 185-92, 220-26, 249-54.
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shooting reveals not only the complexities associated with the Brower
definition, but also confusion arising from the three "seizure" definitions.

II. The Use of Weapons by Police Officers: Applying the
Three "Seizure" Definitions
Police officers may attempt to stop individuals by asking or commanding them to stop, by displaying their guns, or by injuring them. 93
Within each category, of course, are numerous factual distinctions. Application of the three "seizure" definitions to various situations in which
police officers use their weapons reveals the difficult tasks courts face in
determining whether a "seizure" occurred. Some conduct is clearly a
seizure under any definition;94 some conduct, however, is a "seizure"
under the Terry and Mendenhall definitions, but not a "seizure" under
the Brower definition. 95 In addition, conflicting interpretations of the application of these definitions is also possible. In short, as Professors Silas
Wasserstrom and Michael Seidman have accurately stated, "the Court
simply has made a mess of search and seizure law." 96
A. The Display of a Weapon

Because the Supreme Court created a distinction between encounters, which are not governed by the Fourth Amendment, and investigatory stops, which do constitute Fourth Amendment seizures, the
mere presence of a gun on a police officer is insufficient to label any exchange between officers and citizens as a stop. 97 The average citizen expects to view a police officer carrying a gun. The question of when
conduct amounts to a "seizure" arises when police officers remove guns
93. The greatest source of controversy arises when police officers use their guns to effect
an arrest, not when they act in self-defense. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A.
FiuDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 70 (1992).
Some police departments do not have a firearms policy. I d. at 73. Those departments that do
have policies disagree as to the circumstances under which the use of weapons is appropriate.
ld. at 70-71. Some allow officers to use deadly force to effect an arrest when the suspect has
committed a forcible felony, such as "murder, arson, mayhem, burglary, aggravated assault,
rape, kidnapping, extortion, or robbery." Id. at 71. Others allow police to use deadly force
only when " 'someone's life is in direct jeopardy even if the suspect has allegedly committed a
heinous crime and was believed to be dangerous.'" Id. (quoting David B. Griswold, Controlling the Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring the Alternatives, 4 AM. JuR. Police 93, 103
(1985)).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 101, 145-47, 154-55, 238-42, 271-83.
96. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 20.
97. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 210, 212 (1984) (no seizure occurred when
officers with holstered guns approached suspects and asked them questions).
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from their holsters and point them at suspects. 98 Under the Court's recent decision in California v. Hodari D., 99 which purports to interpret the
Terry/Mendenhall "show of authority" prong, 100 the conduct would be a
seizure only if the suspect stops; under the Brower definition, a "seizure"
occurs only if the officers intentionally acquired physical control of the
suspect. 101
Only the Court's recent decision in Hodari D. discussed all three
"seizure" definitions. In one sense, it reaffirmed the vitality of Terry by
declaring two categories of Fourth Amendment seizures: those in which
the officers use physical force and those in which suspects stop as a result
of a Terry/Mendenhall "show of authority." 102 In the first category the
mere touching of a person can constitute a Fourth Amendment
"seizure." 103 In contrast, if there were just a show of authority, then the
suspect would have to stop in response to this assertion for there to be a
Fourth Amendment "seizure."
Under Hodari D., pointing a gun at a suspect would constitute a
"seizure" only if the suspect stopped as a result of this assertion of authority. If the suspect ran, then there would be no Fourth Amendment
seizure. 104
This approach to Fourth Amendment "seizures" leads, however, to
the debatable conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
when police officers repeatedly shoot at suspects, but miss them. 105 In
Cameron v. City of Pontiac 106 a suspect was killed by a car as he ran to
avoid gunfire from police officers. 107 In this situation the Sixth Circuit
held that was no Fourth Amendment "seizure," despite the obvious
"show of authority" through the shooting, because the suspect did not
98. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 116-18.
99. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 36-76 for a discussion of the Terry and Mendenhall
definitions.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of the Brower definition.
102. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550-52.
103. I d. at 1550. Although the Hodari D. decision does suggest that the a "mere touching"
could constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," a touching that is like a touching from an
ordinary citizen would probably not constitute a "seizure." See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 28, at
737 ("physical contact is acceptable if it is 'a normal means of attracting a person's attention.'") (quoting United States v. Burreii, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972)).
104. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
105. Dissenting in Hodari D., Justices Stevens and Marshaii criticized the Court's narrow
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. I d. at 1552-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They stated,
"a police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth
Amendment-as long as he misses his target.'' Id. at 1552.
106. Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1987).
107. ld.
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comply with it. 108
The Sixth Circuit's holding is consistent with Hodari D., which reinterpreted Terry and Mendenhall to require compliance with a show of
authority. 109 Prior to the compliance requirement, shooting at a suspect
could have constituted a "show of authority," which would have allowed
the courts to scrutinize whether the police conduct was reasonable. For
example, under the earlier interpretations of Terry and Mendenhall, the
moment officers use sirens in an attempt to stop someone110 or as soon as
they begin chasing a suspect, "the stop has begun." 111 The Hodari D.
restriction of the Mendenhall definition, however, suggests that the
seizure begins when the suspect stops.
The Hodari D. limitation further undermines an individual's interest
in personal security, particularly when one considers that the majority of
bullets fired by police officers do not hit their intended targets. 112 In
Terry the Court created a reasonable suspicion standard that allowed police officers to stop individuals for limited questioning, 113 even though the
language of the Fourth Amendment suggests that a "probable cause"
standard could have been necessary for these exchanges. 114 The Court,
however, balanced the need for law enforcement against this more limited intrusion into privacy. The individual's interest in privacy, it declared, could be protected by the reasonableness clause: "In our view the
sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all
intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make
the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the
108. Id. at 785.
109. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 546 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1976) ("seizure occurs when the officer first communicates the command to halt").
111. See, e.g., In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. 1987); LaFave, supra note 28, at 758-62.
112. See, e.g. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE, 41 (1991) (in analyzing police shootings in fifty
largest cities in the United States, 52% of all shots resulted in misses); 1992 studies by Geller
and Alpert, to be added in September, will document the frequencies of and some covert reasons for "accidental" shootings; WILLIAM GELLER, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW 194
(1992) (several studies "show relatively high levels of accidental gun discharges or accidental
shootings of persons by police officers during different time periods": Chicago, 9% in 19741983, 15% in 1991; Boston, 27% in the 1970s; New York City, 13% in 1971-75, 24% in 1987,
23% in 1990).
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
114. Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is a mystery how that 'search' and that
'seizure' can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, unless there was 'probable
cause' to believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being
committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed.").
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case, a central element in the analysis ofreasonableness." 115 In contrast,
the Hodari D. narrow "seizure" definition fails to discern any intrusion
of the right to personal security when police officers shoot at individuals
and miss them.
Similar narrow interpretations of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occur when applying the Brower "seizure" definition both
to the mere display of weapons and to shootings missing their targets.
Under Brower, a police officer who points a gun at a suspect effectuates a
Fourth Amendment "seizure" only if there was "an intentional acquisition of physical control." 116 Like theHodari D. definition, an actual stop
is perhaps what the Court means by "physical control." 117 In contrast to
the Hodari D. definition, if the stop were caused by the use of physical
force, then voluntary compliance would not be necessary. The Brower
Court explained that for the purpose of determining whether a seizure
occurred it would not distinguish between a roadblock designed to give a
pursued the option to stop and one designed to produce a collision. 118
Under the Brower decision, an officer thus seizes a suspect by pointing a gun if the suspect stops. The drawing of the gun is an intentional
act that produces physical control over the suspect. But if the officer
shoots at the suspect, misses the target, and the suspect flees, then the
officer has not acquired physical control over the suspect. Under both
the Brower and Hodari definitions, shootings at citizens are not governed
by the Fourth Amendment as long as police officers miss and the citizens
continue to flee. Under Brower, no "seizure" occurs because the shooting
does not result in physical control over the suspect, and under Hodari D.,
no seizure occurs because the suspect has not complied with the "show of
authority" as manifested by the shooting. In short, these "seizure" definition severely narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amendment because
they shield this common and dangerous police practice from review
under the Fourth Amendment while permitting review when individuals
stop in response to other types of coercive conduct, such as verbal
demands.
115. /d. at 18 n.15.
116. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
117. See, e.g., Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 716 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Brower 489
U.S. at 597 (1989) (A seizure occurs when the suspect stops in response to signalling because at
that point the officer has "physical control" over the suspect)). (quoting Brower v. County of
lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989)).
118. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599.
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B. Shooting Citizens

Applying the Court's "seizure" definitions to shootings resulting in
injuries to suspects and bystanders is also difficult. Litigation has included the following common situations: 1) the intentional killing of a
suspect; 119 2) the intentional firing at a suspect who becomes injured yet
continues to fiee; 120 3) "accidental shootings," e.g., the withdrawal of a
gun to stop a suspect, which fires as the officer approaches a suspect, 121
or the firing of a gun after the suspect has stopped in response to the
officer's show of authority; 122 and 4) the firing of a gun at a suspect which
results in injury either to a known passenger123 or an unknown bystander. 124 Central to resolution of the "seizure" issue is examination of
what the Hodari D. Court meant by "physical force" and what the
Brower Court meant by "intentional" conduct.
1.

Intentional Killing of Suspects

The easiest application of the Court's seizure definitions involves
clear, intentional conduct: shootings designed to stop suspects by killing
them and shootings in self-defense. Yet, even in this context, courts have
disagreed as to what type of conduct on the part of police is intentional,
as opposed to reckless or grossly negligent.
The Supreme Court evaluated a shooting designed to kill a suspect
in Tennessee v. Garner. 125 In Garner, a police officer saw a burglary suspect fleeing from a house. 126 When the suspect ignored the officer's command to halt, the officer intentionally shot the suspect in order to stop
him. 127 The issue of whether there was a "seizure" merited only a twosentence discussion from the Court. 128 It stated, "there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 129 In reach119. See infra text accompanying notes 125-51 for a discussion of intentional killings of
suspects.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 152-55 for a discussion intentional injuries to
suspects.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 156-214.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 215-58.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 259-84 for a discussion of injuries to a known
passenger.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 285-88 for a discussion of injuries to an unknown
bystander.
125. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
126. Id. at 3.
127. /d. at 4.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
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ing this conclusion, the Court did not qualify the types of killings that
constitute "seizures." It only noted that the suspect died as a result of
the intentional shooting. 130
Similarly, in Brower v. County of lnyo, 131 police officers stopped a
pursued driver by using deadly force, this time in the form of a roadblock. 132 Just like the fleeing victim in Garner, the pursued driver refused to stop. 133 Even though the suspect did not voluntarily comply
with the police officers' show of authority as manifested by the roadblock, police officers used physical force to effectuate a stop. The Brower
held that police officers seized the driver when he hit the roadblock and
stopped. 134
Thus under both Garner and Brower voluntary compliance with a
show of authority is not necessary if police officers intentionally cause a
stop using physical force. In Garner the officer intentionally shot his
gun, 135 and in Brower, the officers intentionally established a roadblock.
Although both Garner and Brower involved obvious intentional conduct by the police, courts have disagreed as to how to evaluate an intentional killing when the officer asserts that the shooting was in selfdefense. 136 Even though a jury may resolve the issue of whether the officer acted intentionally, 137 some courts have prevented the issue from
going to trial by determining that no "seizure" occurred. For example,
in Estate ofJackson v. City ofRochester, 138 a federal district court in New
York held that a police officer did not seize a suspect by shooting him
because the purpose of the shooting was to act in self defense, not to
effectuate a Fourth Amendment "investigatory stop." 139 It also declared
that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to the shooting because
130. Id. at 11.
131. 489 U.S. 593 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this

case.
132. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595 (1989).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 599.
135. See generally Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986) (intentional
killing of suspect stated claim under the Fourth Amendment).
136. Compare Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1989) (shooting constituted a
"seizure"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495,
1502 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986); Loria v. Town oflrondequoit, 775 F.
Supp. 599, 604 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); with Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp.
779, 786 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (no seizure); see also Frank G. Zarb, Police Liability for Creating
the Need to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1982, 1995-2002 (1988) (excellent examination of the issues associated with self-defense shootings by police officers).
137. See, e.g., Loria v. Town of Inrondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 604 (W.D.N.Y. 1990);
Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1432 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
138. 705 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
139. Id. at 786.
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it occurred after a "completed" investigatory stop. 140
In conflict with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is the
same court's subsequent decision in Loria v. Town of Irondequoit. 141 In
Loria, it held that a "seizure" occurred when a police officer shot a suspect in self-defense. 142 The Loria court explained that the officer's motive in using the gun goes to the issue of reasonableness, not to the issue
of whether there was a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 143 It explained
that the Fourth Amendment would thus be implicated if the jury determined either that "he drew his weapon intending to use it, or that he..
meant to fire it at the time of discharge." 144
The disagreement as to whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated when officers assert that a shooting was in self-defense appears to
focus on the scope of the Brower "seizure" definition. In Brower, the
Supreme Court emphasized that a "seizure" requires "an intentional acquisition of physical control" which causes the suspect to stop, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily. 145 Determining whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated during a shooting allegedly done in self-defense should not depend upon whether it occurred before or soon after
the suspect stops. A self-defense shooting is itself an admitted intentional
act. If the act result in physical control of a suspect, then the Fourth
Amendment should be considered implicated because it meets even the
restrictive Brower "seizure" definition. The Loria court explained that a
contrary view would result in an "overly restrictive" interpretation of
Brower. 146 Determining that a "seizure" occurred when officers intentionally kill a suspect during an investigatory stop or while acting in selfdefense is also consistent with the Hodari D. Court's dicta about the use
of physical force. 147 Although Hodari D. defined when a seizure occurs
in the absence of physical force, it nonetheless made some broad statements about the use of physical force. It stated that "the mere touching
of a person would suffice" as a "seizure." 148 In addition, it explained
140. Id.

141. 775 F. Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
142. Id. at 604.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 603-04. It stated that a jury could determine that the officer intended to use the
gun within the meaning of Brower not only because the gun had to have been cocked before
using it, but also because six pounds of force was necessary to pull the trigger. Id.
145. Brewer, 489 U.S. at 596.
146. Loria, 775 F. Supp. at 603-04.
147. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991).
148. Id. at 1550 n.2 (1991). The Court never adequately explained its use of the common
law in determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." At one point the Court
stated that it is "irrelevant that English law proscribed 'an unlawful attempt to take a presumptively innocent person into custody.'" Id. (emphasis in original). In contrast, the Court

Winter 1993]

SHOOTINGS AS FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES

357

that if the person escaped control after the touching, the arrest did not
continue. 149 It also stated that a "seizure" could be a "single act, ... not
a continuous fact." 150 With this broad interpretation of physical force,
the Hodari D. dicta thus resembles the Terry Court, which stated that the
use of physical force constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. 151
Under all three Supreme Court "seizure" definitions-Terry,
Brower, and Hodari, which modified the Mendenhall definition-police
officers thus seize individuals within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they intentionally kill them. .These shootings generally do
not engender complex questions as to the scope of the Court's "seizure"
definitions because the police officers admit that they intentionally killed
the suspects, whether during an investigation or as an act of self-defense.
2.

Intentional Injury of Fleeing Suspects

A more complex case occurs when a suspect flees after being shot by
police officers. 152 Whether a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred depends upon which seizure definition a court applies. Under Terry and
Hodari D.'s dicta 153 on physical force, a seizure occurs when the bullet
hits the suspect because the officer has used physical force. Under
Brower, however, that conclusion is debatable because one may interpret
the Court's decision to exclude physical force that does not cause an immediate stop or one shortly after the use of physical force.
In declaring another "seizure" definition, the Brower Court did not
adopt a physical-injury litmus test for Fourth Amendment "seizure." It
explained that a "seizure" occurs only when officers act intentionally,
did find relevant the common law when an officer has actual custody of an individual. Id. To
justify its conclusions, the Court relied on its notion of what type of conduct implicates the
Fourth Amendment. Id. This latter justification is implicitly related to balancing. In this
context the Court failed to discern the significance of personal liberty. It tersely explained that
even though "street pursuits always place the public at some risk, ... compliance with police
orders to stop should be therefore encouraged." Id. at 1551.
149. Id. at 1550.
150. Id. (comparing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1873)).
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
152. See, e.g., Cooper v. Merrill, 736 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. Del. 1990) (the first shot hitting
the suspect caused him to gasp, but not to stop; he continued toward the officer, who fired two
more times; the suspect escaped but fell over some bushes; officer later hit him twice as suspect
attempted to give himself up). In Cooper, the police officer admitted that he seized the suspect
by shooting him. 736 F. Supp. at 559.
153. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550 ("To constitute an arrest ... the mere grasping or
application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the
arrestee, was sufficient"). The Court also cites an 1862 case to support its view of physical
force: "officer effects an arrest of a person whom he has authority to arrest, by laying his hand
on him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping and holding
him") Id. (citing Whitehead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. 495, 501 (1862)).
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regardless of the harm caused by police officers. It stated that if an officer's parked cruiser accidentally "slips its brake and pins" an innocent
bystander or a serial killer, no seizure has occurred. 154 Few, however,
would dispute the Court's conclusions here because these situations involve obvious negligence claims unrelated to investigations and arrests.
Under Brower there is no "seizure" because the officers objectively did
not intend to stop the bystander or the killer by using their cruiser as a
weapon.
Application of the Brower definition to the injured fleeing suspect
reveals some of the problems with the definition. In this situation, there
is an objective intent to stop the suspect as demonstrated by aiming the
gun and repeatedly hitting the suspect. What is missing, however, is the
actual stop. The Brower Court stated that it is "enough for a seizure that
a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in
place in order to achieve that result." 155 In other words, there must be
both the intent to stop and a stop caused by the intent to stop. The
Brower definition does not clarify when an individual must stop in response to an officers use of physical force. For example, it is unclear if
the Brower definition would bar recovery for injuries arising from a
shooting in which the suspect fled and was captured the next day or if the
person died the next day as a result of the shooting.
In this situation, whether an injured fleeing suspect has been seized
depends upon which definition a court applies. Under both Terry and
Hodari D.'s dicta, a seizure occurs when the officer's bullet hits the suspects because the bullet represents the use of physical force; however,
under Brower, one may contend that a "seizure" occurs only when the
suspect stops shortly after being injured. Consequently, in this situation,
application of the Court's seizure definitions results in conflicting conclusions as to the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
3.

"Accidental Shootings" of Suspects

The Brower definition of a "seizure," in contrast to the Terry and
Hodari D.'s definitions, also similarly shields "accidental shootings"
from scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. 156 Two situations are common: guns "accidentally" discharge as police officers approach a suspect157 and guns "accidentally" discharge as they arrest someone who
154. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).
155. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
156. See infra text accompanying notes 157-290 for a discussion of cases in which courts
have failed to find the Fourth Amendment implicated because the officers did not intend to
shoot their weapons.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214.
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has stopped. 158 The central issue is to understand what the Court means
by "intentional conduct."
a. Shootings During Investigations
In the first situation, officers draw their weapons while investigating
suspicious activity. As they approach the suspects with drawn guns, the
suspects do not respond to this assertion of authority either because they
do not see the guns or because they choose to ignore the officers' requests. 159 The suspects eventually stop because police officers "accidentally" discharge their drawn guns, hitting or killing the suspects. 160
In analyzing this situation, courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether the suspects were "seized" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 161 Those courts that have found that there was no
"seizure" have described the shooting as an accident. 162 In contrast,
some courts have found that this type of shooting is a Fourth Amendment "seizure" by implicitly recognizing the seriousness of drawing a
gun. 163 They have proceeded to analyze whether the drawing of the gun
was reasonable under the circumstances. By examining some of these
conflicting cases in light of the Court's three "seizure" definitions, one
can discern the bases for the confusion and the need for the Supreme
Court to declare that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when police
officers withdraw their weapons during an investigation or an arrest.
One federal district court refused to find the Fourth Amendment
applicable to a shooting because the shooting "was not a volitional
act." 164 In Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 165 which was decided before
Brower v. County oflnyo, 166 a police officer suspected that two men were
about to leave the parking lot in a stolen truck. 167 With his gun drawn,
158. See infra text accompanying notes 215-58.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 159-214.
161. Compare Glasco v. Ballard, 768 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("a wholly accidental shooting is not a 'seizure' ") and Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1557
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (no seizure because shooting was "not a volitional act") with Pleasant v.
Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1990) (court analyzes both the withdrawal of gun and
failure to reholster to determine if conduct was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 164-92.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 193-214.
164. Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
165. Id. at 1552.
166. 489 U.S. 593 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this

case.
167. Matthews, 699 F. Supp. at 1553.

360

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 20:337

the police officer ordered the driver to "disengage the engine." 168 The
officer then placed his gun at or near the driver's head and ordered him
and his passenger to exit the truck. 169 When the driver failed to comply
with the officer's demand, the officer reached into the truck to disengage
the engine. 170 The truck suddenly "lurched forward," hitting either the
officer's hand or weapon. 171 The gun then discharged into the driver's
head, killing him. 172
After considering these facts, the federal district court determined
that no "seizure" occurred. 173 Its conclusion, however, was not based on
any of the Supreme Court's seizure definitions. It instead focused on the
lack of intent to fire the gun, not the intentional act of drawing the gun
and pointing it at the suspect's head. 174 Even though the court recognized that "under the proper facts" the drawing of a gun and its firing
could both be Fourth Amendment seizuresP5 it balanced the parties'
interests and determined that the drawing of a gun generally does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 176 It declared that officers may draw
their guns even if they would not be justified in firing them. 177 The district court implicitly based this bright-line rule on the theory of time
reaction: officers must have their guns ready for use because suspects can
injure or kill them faster than they can react. 178
Another federal district court has also found support for a similar
conclusion by applying the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition from
Brower v. County of Inyo. In Glasco v. Ballard, 119 a federal district court
stated, "[A] wholly accidental shooting is not a 'seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 180 In that case, a police officer
drove alongside two men who were walking. 181 He thought he noticed in
one of the men's pockets objects stolen from a convenience store. 182
While in his car, the officer asked the man what was in his pocket. 183
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Jd.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1553-54.
699 F. Supp. at 1557.
Id.
Jd.
Id.
Id.
Jd.
768 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1991).
Jd. at 180.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
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When the officer could not understand the man's response, he got out of
his cruiser and withdrew his gun. 184 The cruiser, however, rolled forward. 185 The officer in attempting to stop the car lost control of his gun,
which discharged and hit one of the suspects in the neck. 186
In applying the Brower definition, the court interpreted the Supreme
Court's definition to focus on the intent to harm the suspect, not the
means used to stop the suspect. 187 The court stated that under Brower,
"it is still relevant whether the officer intended to perform the underlying
violent act at all." 188 The court refused to analyze whether the drawing
of the gun was a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 189 Under its narrow
interpretation of Brower, the district court focused only on the firing of
the gun. In addition, it interpreted what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" by attempting to define the line between an ordinary state
tort and a Fourth Amendment violation. 190 The court stated that if an
accident were a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then police officers would
automatically be liable under the Fourth Amendment for negligent conduct.191 It determined that more than negligent conduct was necessary
to violate the Fourth Amendment. 192 The court thus limited the reach of
the Fourth Amendment by focusing only on the act of shooting, an "accident," and not the intentional act of withdrawing a gun.
Others courts, however, both before and after Brower, have not interpreted the Fourth Amendment so narrowly. They have focussed on
whether there was an objective intent to stop the individual and whether
the drawing of the gun was reasonable under the circumstances. In
Pleasant v. Zamieski, 193 a police officer was investigating an alleged theft
of an automobile. 194 He approached the driver, identified himself,
"showed" the driver his gun, and commanded the driver to get out of the
car. 195 The driver, who initially refused to leave the car, got out and
began to climb a fence. 196 As the officer grabbed the driver, the gun
"accidentally discharged" into the suspect's back, killing him. 197
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

768 F. Supp. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
768 F. Supp. at 179.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
895 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990).
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In addressing the Fourth Amendment claim, the Sixth Circuit in
Pleasant determined that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to two
claims: the officer's intentional decision to draw his gun and the officer's
failure to reholster the gun as the driver tried to escape. 198 The court
interpreted Brower to question whether the gun was the instrumentality
used to effectuate a stop. 199 It explained that whether the officer had
acted properly in drawing the gun was a question relating to the second
issue in Fourth Amendment cases, whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable. 200 It stated, "[t]he inquiry as to whether or not
some action constitutes a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment is distinct from the inquiry as to whether an action already found to constitute
a Fourth Amendment seizure is also 'unreasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment. " 201 The court thus found that the suspect had been
seized. 202 It used the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident as
facts to consider in determining whether the officer acted reasonably.2° 3
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jenkins v. Averett204 evaluated an officer's conduct prior to a shooting to determine
whether it was reasonable. 205 Like the Pleasant court, it did not find
controlling the officer's assertion that the firing was an accident. 206 In
Jenkins, a police officer chased a youth who fled upon the sight of seeing
a police car. 207 Mter using the cruiser to chase the youth, the officer got
out of the car, "drew and cocked his pistol, and then chased his quarry
about 60 feet." 208 When the officer yelled "halt," the youth stopped.2°9
A few seconds later, the officer's gun "accidentally" discharged. 210
The court determined that the Fourth Amendment was applicable
to this shooting by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v.
Ohio. 211 As Terry explained, the "right of personal security belongs as
much to the citizen on the street of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 212 It stated that the
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

895 F.2d at 276-77.
Id. at 277 (interpreting Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 276-77.
424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1232.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
424 F.2d at 1232; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
Id. at 1232 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1, 8-9 (1968)).
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word "accident" was not a talisman for releasing the officer from liability.213 The shooting was only an accident in the sense that the harm was
not "specifically intended."214 It declared that the Fourth Amendment
was applicable because the officer acted wantonly in shooting the suspect.215 It did not determine that the Fourth Amendment was applicable
because the suspect had stopped in compliance with the officer's show of
authority. Under these facts, however, the conduct would also signify a
"seizure" under both prongs of the Hodari D. "seizure" definition regardless of the time frame used. 216 When the suspect stopped in compliance with the officer's command to halt, the officer "seized" him. When
the officer shot him, thus using physical force, he also "seized" him.
Under both the Terry and Hodari D. definitions of "seizure" a seizure
occurred.
The conflicts in analyzing shootings that occur during investigations
thus arise from whether courts evaluate the officer's conduct prior to the
shooting or just the shooting itself. They also arise from different interpretations of Brower, with some courts requiring an intent to harm and
others requiring an intent to stop.
b. Shootings After a Seizure Has Occurred
Other issues surface when analyzing a shooting that follows a
Fourth Amendment seizure. In contrast to shootings occurring during
investigations, the Fourth Amendment is always implicated when the
suspect stops in compliance with the officer's show of authority. 217 The
question in this situation is how to analyze a shooting that follows a
Fourth Amendment "seizure." Similar to the decisions addressing "accidental" shootings during investigations, some courts have considered
only the conduct of the shooting itself, even though the shootings occurred after a Fourth Amendment "seizure."218 They have failed to find
the Fourth Amendment implicated because the shooting was an "accident."219 In contrast, other courts have focused on the act of drawing a
weapon and analyzed whether this act was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Am.endment. 22° Few courts, however, have discussed
whether the prior Fourth Amendment seizure supports a determination
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 1232.
Id.
Id.
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991).
See infra text accompanying notes 220-42.
See infra text accompanying notes 202-24.
See infra text accompanying notes 243-58.
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that the post-seizure shooting implicated the Fourth Amendment. 221 In
this context, a question emerges as to whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to post-seizure conduct by police officers.222
In a decision decided before Brower, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals223 declared that the Fourth Amendment applies to shootings
designed for "the purpose of seizing" the suspect, not accidents that happen after the suspect has stopped.224 In Dodd, a police officer had
stopped a burglary suspect. 225 With his weapon drawn, the officer placed
one handcuff on the suspect who was lying on the ground after falling
through a window.226 As the officer attempted to put the other handcuff
on, the suspect reached for the officer's gun. 227 As the officer attempted
to keep his gun from the suspect, it "accidentally" discharged, killing the
suspect. 228 The court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not
221. See, e.g., Loria v. Town of Irondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 604 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(court distinguishes cases in which a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred before the shooting); Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 779, 786 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("the
shooting was unrelated to the stop"; officer "did not shoot [the suspect] for the purpose of
seizing him"); see generally Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (the court
rejects the concept of a continuing "seizure" because "it could lead to an unwarranted expansion of constitutional law; the court, however, determines that a suspect had stated a claim
under the fourteenth amendment, which requires the suspect to prove conduct that "shocks
the conscience"; the court refuses to label this deprivation of "liberty" a claim of "substantive
due process," even though most courts do) (cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026) (1990)).
222. Two recent Supreme Court cases support analysis of this latter issue. In Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to
"all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen...." Id. at 395
(emphasis in original). Although it explained that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to excessive force claims asserted by pretrial detainees, it did not explain which amendment applies
to force used after a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Id. at 395 n.lO. In addition, in California
v. Hodari, Ill S. Ct. 1547 (1991), the Supreme Court implied that a scenario could result in
multiple seizures if the suspect escaped after the initial seizure. Id. at 1550. It cited an 1874
case for the proposition that a" 'seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact.'" I d. (citing
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 411 (1874)). When read together, these cases
could suggest that "the course of an arrest" or an "investigation" could result in multiple
claims under the Fourth Amendment if each aspect of the challenged conduct constitutes a
Fourth Amendment "seizure.'' They also, however, support applying the Fourth Amendment
to a post-seizure shooting because during the investigation or arrest the officer has maintained
control over the suspect. In this context, one could interpret the conduct as a "continuing
arrest.'' Analysis of some of these situations reveals the difficulties of applying the Court's
"seizure" definitions.
223. Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007
(1988).
224. Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7.
225. Id. at 2-3.
226. Id. at 3.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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apply because "[t]he shooting was a pure accident." 229
When the Second Circuit decided what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure," it did not cite the Terry or Mendenhall definitions. The Second Circuit instead relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Tennessee v. Garner, 230 in which the officer intentionally killed the
fleeing suspect in order to stop him. 231 The Second Circuit stated that
the Garner decision clearly indicated that intentional conduct was necessary to effectuate a Fourth Amendment "seizure."232 The court thus
found that there was no "seizure" in this case because the shooting was
not intentional and because it was not done "for the purpose of seizing"
the suspect. 233 In addition to its interpretation of Garner, the court also
maintained that negligent conduct during an arrest is not actionable
under the Fourth Amendment. 234
After the Court's decision in Brower, other courts have similarly analyzed post-seizure shootings. A federal district court in Troublefield v.
City of Harrisburg2 35 determined that post-seizure shootings should be
evaluated in the same manner as shootings during the course of an investigation. 236 In Troublefield, a police officer suspected a driver in a parked
car of automobile theft. 237 The officer withdrew his weapon, approached
the car, and asked the driver if he owned the car. 238 When the driver
admitted that he did not, the officer ordered him to get out of the car and
lie on the ground. 239 The officer then handcuffed the suspect. 240 As he
returned his gun to his holster, it accidentally discharged into the driver's
leg_241
The federal court interpreted the Brower "seizure" definition to require an intent to stop a suspect by shooting him. 242 Because the suspect
had already been stopped, there was no intent to stop the suspect by
229. Id. at 7.
230. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 125-30 for a discussion of this
case.
231. Id. at 7-22.
232. Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7.
233. Id.
234. I d. at 7-8; see also Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 569 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (negligent shooting not actionable); but see Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d
1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1988) (negligence may be actionable under Fourth Amendment).
235. 789 F. Supp. 160 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
236. Id. at 166.
237. Id. at 162.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 789 F. Supp. at 162.
242. Id. at 165-66.
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using a gun. 243 It refused to scrutinize whether the officer was negligent
in "pulling out a firearm or in reholstering it" because it found that negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the
Fourth Amendment. 244 It did, however, state that the Fourth Amendment would be implicated if an officer intended to shoot a suspect who
had already stopped. 245 The court explained that a shooting under those
circumstances would constitute a "second seizure."246
In contrast to the extremely narrow viewpoints expressed in
Troublefield and Dodd, other courts have determined that similar postseizure shootings implicate the Fourth Amendment. 247 They have questioned whether the act of withdrawing a gun was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. They have interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to require courts to evaluate the circumstances to determine
whether the use of a gun was reasonable.
In Leber v. Smith, 248 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that a driver who was stopped by a roadblock was "seized"249 under the
Court's definition in Mendenhall, which stated that a "seizure" occurs
when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 250 The Sixth Circuit appeared to automatically subject the police officer's conduct following the seizure to scrutiny under the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment. It evaluated whether the officer acted reasonably in
approaching the stopped driver with his gun drawn. 251 Even though
both parties agreed that the gun accidentally discharged when the officer
slipped on some ice, the court nevertheless required the officer to provide
reasons for approaching the suspect with a gun. 252
The seriousness of drawing a gun was also considered by a federal
court in Patterson v. Fuller. 253 In this case, an officer had a suspect lie on
the floor near a companion. 254 As the officer stood at the suspect's head,
243. /d. at 166. The court stated, "as [the driver] was injured by a bullet fired by accident,
no Fourth Amendment rights have been trampled upon because [the officer] did not intend the
bullet to bring [the driver] within his control or to, perhaps, settle him down were be struggling to break free." Id.
244. Id. at 166.
245. Id. at 166.
246. ld.
247. See infra text accompanying notes 244-58.
248. 773 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1084 (1986).
249. Leber, 113 F.2d at 105.
250. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908
(1980).
251. Leber, 713 F.2d at 105.
252. Id.
253. 654 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
254. Id. at 420.
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another officer had a shotgun to maintain control.255 When the suspect
moved his hand, the officer stepped back and tripped on an ashtray. 256
His cocked gun accidentally discharged, killing the suspect. 257 Instead of
· characterizing the shooting as an "accident," the court determined that
the shooting constituted a "seizure. " 258
Even though the Second Circuit in Dodd had interpreted the Garner
decision to require an intentional shooting, the federal district court
noted that all nine justices in Garner had agreed "that apprehension by
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 259 Although the Patterson court recognized the ambiguity associated with the Mendenhall definition, the
court thought that it was obvious that killing someone constituted a
Fourth Amendment "seizure."260 It also determined that negligence was
actionable under the Fourth Amendment. 261 Liability would attach if a
jury determined that the officer was negligent in standing with a cocked
gun over the head of the suspect.262 The court thus focused on the officer's conduct that preceded the shooting.
The cases thus reveal the different approaches the circuits have
taken in defining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when
guns "accidentally" discharge during an investigation or after a seizure.
One disagreement arises from how courts view the act of drawing a gun:
some courts refuse to evaluate the reasonableness of this act and others
focus on it. Courts also disagree on whether negligence is actionable.
These conflicts implicitly reflect different views of the authority that the
Fourth Amendment affords courts to evaluate each action taken by police officers during their investigations and arrests.
4.

"Accidental" Injuries to Known and Unknown Bystanders

Because all three "seizure" definitions arose in situations in which
the use of physical force or the "show of authority" was directed at the
suspect, most courts have applied the Fourth Amendment only to the
relationship between the police officer and the suspect, not the officer and
injured bystanders. 263 Some courts, however, have applied the Fourth
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
654 F. Supp. at 426.
Id. at 426 (quoting Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 261-70, 275-88.
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Amendment to claims arising from injuries to bystanders if police officers
knew or should have known of their presence when they decided to use
physical force to stop a suspect.2 6:'1- An examination of some of these conflicting decisions also reveals the problems in understanding the scope of
the Court's "seizure" definitions.
Courts have disagreed as to how to apply the Court's "seizure" definitions to situations in which police officers "accidentally" injure known
bystanders as they use physical force to apprehend a suspect. In LandolRivera v. Cruz Cosme, 265 the First Circuit Court of Appeals very narrowly interpreted the Brower decision by not applying the tort doctrine of
"transferred intent"266 to a shooting. 267 In that case, police officers were
attempting to stop a driver who had just used a gun to rob a store and
who had taken a hostage into an automobile. 268 As the driver, who had
the hostage on his lap, tried to drive away, a police officer shot at the
driver, but hit the hostage instead, causing serious injury.269
The First Circuit rejected the hostage's Fourth Amendment claim
by holding that the officer had not seized him by the shooting.270 It refused to define "intent" in terms of the "deliberateness with which a
given action is taken." 271 It stated that Brower required "police action
directed toward producing a particular result." 272 Under this interpretation of Brower, the court determined that the shooting was not directed
at stopping the hostage, but rather at stopping the suspect. 273 A
"seizure" would have occurred only if the bullet had hit its desired object, the driver. The doctrine of "transferred intent," however, indicates
that intent travels with the bullet: if a police officer intended to wound
the suspect, but "accidentally" hits the hostage, the officer has acted "in264. See infra text accompanying notes 270-74.
265. 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990).
266. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 8, at 37-39 (5th ed. 1984) (under this doctrine if one intends to harm a person, but the act
unforeseeably results in injury to another, the injury is nevertheless deemed intentional).
267. 906 F.2d at 794-96.
268. Id. at 791-92.
269. Id. at 792.
270. Id. at 795.
271. I d.
272. I d.
273. Id. at 795. The court stated, "no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred here because
[the hostage] was not the object of the police bullet that struck him." I d. Another judge has
suggested that this narrow interpretation of a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is proper. See
Adams v. St. Luckie County Sheriff's Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1574 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson,
J., dissenting) (known passenger in vehicle may not have been "seized" by a police cruiser,
which rammed the vehicle because he was not the "object" of the seizure).
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tentionally" in wounding the hostage. 274 If courts were to apply this tort
doctrine to the issue of interpreting what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," they would determine that a "seizure" occurred and
then proceed to determine if the "seizure" was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Application of this tort doctrine
would thus sometimes afford innocent bystanders with a civil remedy in
damages. In contrast to suspects who may at times be able to suppress
evidence as a result of an unlawful "seizure," innocent bystanders only
remedy against reckless shootings is one in damages for a violation of a
constitutional right.
Other courts, however, have found Fourth Amendment "seizures"
under similar circumstances, without having to invoke the doctrine of
transferred intent. In examining the use of physical force to stop a vehicle containing a suspect and passenger, some courts have found that officers have "seized" every person in the vehicle. 275 In Keller v. Frink, 216
a federal district court interpreted the Brower definition more broadly
than the First Circuit. It determined that if an officer intended to stop a
car by shooting at it and the car stops, then the officer has "seized" every
person in the vehicle. 277 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that when a
police officer stopped a driver by using a roadblock, the officer had also
"seized" the passenger, whom the officer knew was present. 278 In that
case, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an officer's knowledge of a passenger's presence may be relevant to determining whether a "seizure" occurred. In the context of shooting at vehicles or stopping them by a
roadblock, the courts thus disagree whether police officers seize passengers when their objective intent is to stop the driver. This conflict is
possible because there are different interpretations of what the Brower
seizure definition meant by "intentional conduct." Some courts require
an objective intent to stop a particular individual, and others require an
objective intent to use means which results in a stop, whether of a known
or unknown person.
In other situations, courts have also failed to find that known bystanders were "seized" because of their interpretation of "intentional"
conduct. In Frye v. Town ofAkron, 219 a federal district court determined
274. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 262 § 8, at 37-39.
275. See, e.g., Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir.
1992) ("intentional successful use of physical force applied directly to an automobile in order
to apprehend its occupants implicates the Fourth Amendment and constitutes a seizure").
276. 745 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
277. /d. at 1432.
278. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985).
279. 759 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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that a police officer who crashed into the pursued motorcyclist and his
passenger did not "seize" the passenger. 280 The court stated that no
"seizure" occurred because under Brower the officer had not "intended"
to cause a stop by crashing into the motorcycle.281 In contrast, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roach v. City of Fredericktown 282
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment the claim asserted by a motorist
who was injured when a pursued driver crashed into him. 283 The court
applied the Fourth Amendment because the injury to the innocent motorist had occurred during the pursuit.Z84 It interpreted the Court's decision in Graham v. Connor 85 to apply to this claim because it had arisen
"in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop."286 After determining
that the Fourth Amendment was implicated, it determined that the officer did not violate the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment
in conducting a high-speed pursuit of a stolen automobile. 287
Even though the federal courts disagree as to when a known bystander is "seized" by the application of physical force, most courts do
not find the Fourth Amendment applicable when unknown bystanders
are injured during an investigation.288 To illustrate, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rucker v. Harford County289 held that a bystander
whom the officers reasonably believed had left the scene of a confrontation was not "seized" when a stray bullet hit him. 290 The court noted
that officers had told the bystander to leave, that the bystander had the
opportunity to leave, and that the bystander should have willingly left
because the confrontation between the suspect and the officers presented
"visible danger." 291 In finding no seizure, the court interpreted the
Brower definition and declared that absent intent (either to harm or to
stop) the "shooting was purely accidental" and therefore failed to invoke
280. Id. at 1323.
281. /d.
282. 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989).
283. Id. at 297.
284. /d.
285. 490 u.s. 386 (1989).
286. Roach, 882 F.2d at 297.
287. /d.
288. See, e.g., Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.3 (lOth Cir.
1992) (Fourth Amendment not applicable to driver who was injured by the vehicle of a fleeing
suspect). Many courts, however, have considered the claims of injured third parties under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 1496 (collecting
cases).
289. 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991).
290. Id. at 281.
291. Id. at 281-82.
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the Fourth Amendment. 292
In determining whether police officers have seized known and unknown bystanders by injuring them, courts have thus applied some of the
same contrasting viewpoints as expressed when analyzing injuries to suspects. They have disagreed as to whether conduct they label an "accident" can constitute a seizure, regardless of whether the injured person
was a suspect or a bystander. They have also interpreted Brower differently, with some courts requiring an intent to harm and others requiring
an intent to stop.
Courts considering the claims of bystanders, similar to courts evaluating the claims of injured suspects, attempt to define the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, they also frequently discuss the relationship of the Fourth Amendment with the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 293 Courts have disagreed as
to whether the Fourth Amendment is the only ground on which injured
individuals may properly assert a basis of recovery. 294 An examination
of this conflicts reveals the contrasting viewpoints of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.

ill. "Accidental" Shooting Claims Under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendements
In analyzing shootings by police officers, lower courts have not only
had different interpretations of the Court's three "seizure" definitions in
Terry, Mendenhall, and Brower, they have also disagreed as to whether
shootings that did not constitute Fourth Amendment "seizures" are nevertheless actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 295 Some courts
have determined that accidental shootings may be actionable under the
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, 296
and others have determined that accidental shootings that occur during
an investigation or an arrest may be actionable only under the Fourth
Amendment. 297 At the core of this conflict is the role of the Fourth
292. Id.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 292-93, 305.
294. See infra text accompanying note 293.
295. See infra text accompanying notes 292-93.
296. See, e.g., Rucker v. Hartford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990);
Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Fcye v. Town of
Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218,
1223 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 779, 785
(W.D.N.Y. 1989); Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp. 418, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
297. See, e.g., Troublefield v. City of Harrisburg, 789 F. Supp. 160, 166-67 (M.D. Pa.
1992); Montgomecy v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1255-56 (W.D. Mich. 1990),
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Amendment: whether it protects individuals from reckless or grossly
negligent police shootings and whether it protects individuals who are
injured during the detention immediately following their arrest. Recent
Supreme Court decisions support the view that the Fourth Amendment
is the proper amendment under which to analyze shootings by police
officers.
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor298 attempted to
clarify the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment and its applications to police shootings.299 When analyzing excessive force claims,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to "seized'' suspects,
and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "pretrial detainees," classifications, however, not clearly defined by the Court. 300 The Supreme
Court held that conduct that is actionable under the Fourth Amendment
is not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 301 It determined
that the Fourth Amendment was the sole amendment for alleging that
police officers used unreasonable force during a seizure because the
Amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against ... physically intrusive governmental conduct... .''302 The
Court did not, however, expound upon what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure." It merely reiterated in a footnote the Terry definition and cited the Brower definition. 303 It identified classic situations
involving Fourth Amendment "seizures": an arrest and an investigative
stop. 304 The Court did, however, also state that the Fourth Amendment
applies to "other 'seizure[s]' of a free citizen." 305
affd mem., 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F. Supp. 1293,
1299 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1990) affd mem., 953 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992).
298. 490 u.s. 386 (1989).
299. Jd. at 394-95. Prior to and after the Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1 (1985), lower courts applied different standards for determining whether officials had used
excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, The
Constitutionality of High-speed pursuits under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 209-11 (1991).
300. 490 U.S. at 395 n.IO.
301. Id. at 395.
302. I d.
303. Id. at 395 n.10.
304. Jd. at 395.
305. See, e.g., McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1992) (child was
"seized" by officer's pointing of a gun at his head during the execution of a search warrant,
even though the child was not a suspect or interfering with the search); see also Michigan
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (stop of a driver at a roadblock for
inspection of signs of intoxication).
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The Graham Court, however, did leave open an important question
that directly relates to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. It recognized that it has not resolved the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies "beyond the point at which [an] arrest ends and pretrial
detention begins." 306
Despite the Graham Court's demarcation between the proper application of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in
County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin 301 never discussed applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the issue of how long the government may detain
suspects without a probable cause determination. In Riverside, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply to claims
that governmental officials had failed to provide timely probable cause
determinations for suspects who had been detained for days. 308 Even
though one could easily classify the plaintiffs as "pretrial detainees," the
Court did not evaluate these claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 309 The Fourth Amendment was the proper amendment for their
protection because the Court had previously applied it when determining
the type of a probable cause hearing necessary. 310 In short, the Fourth
Amendment guided the Court in determining not only what type of
probable cause hearings suspects are to receive, but also when they are to
receive them. 311
306. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.lO. This unresolved question, however, is an issue related
to shootings after a "seizure" has occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 213-56.
307. 111 s. Ct. 1661 (1991).
308. /d. at 1667-71.
309. /d. at 1665, 1667-71.
310. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (after a warrantless arrest, a prompt
hearing to determine probable cause is necessary under the Fourth Amendment under some
circumstances).
311. County of Riverside, Ill S. Ct. at 1670. The Court created a three-part standard for
determining when a hearing was prompt: (1) a hearing within forty-eight hours is generally
permissible, (2) a hearing within forty-eight hours may nevertheless violate the Fourth
Amendment if the delay was caused by a need to gather evidence, ill will, or "delay for delay's
sake," and (3) a hearing after forty-eight hours may nevertheless be prompt if the government
can establish that "extraordinary circumstances" caused the delay. /d.
This application of the Fourth Amendment to post-seizure conduct is consistent with the
lower federal courts' trend to extend the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond an arrest.
See, e.g., Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (lOth Cir. 1991) (Fourth Amendment applies to "treatment of the arrestee detained without a warrant"); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d
842, 845 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (Fourth Amendment applies to force used in administering
a blood test at the hospital after the plaintiff was arrested), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991);
Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth Amendment applies to force
used prior to time plaintiff was arraigned or formally charged); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830
F.2d 706, 713 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (Fourth Amendment applies to force used before booking
and the setting of bail); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (Fourth
Amendment applies to force used in "effecting and maintaining arrests"), cert. denied, 484
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In addition, the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D. 312 suggested that the Fourth Amendment may apply to the conduct of police
officers after they effectuate a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 313 The
Court briefly mentioned the concepts of a "continuing arrest" and of
multiple "seizures." 314 It explained that if an officer used physical force
to stop a suspect, an arrest might have occurred, but if the suspect escaped then there would not be a "continuing arrest.'ms Application of
these concepts to a situation in which officers maintain control over a
suspect might suggest that there is a "continuing arrest" and the Fourth
Amendment applies to conduct until the suspect becomes a pretrial
detainee. 316
Although these Supreme Court decisions suggest a broad application of the Fourth Amendment to conduct by police officers, the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless re-emerged as a ground for excessive
force claims after the Court's decision in Brower v. County of Inyo. 317 In
Brower, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of the Fourth
Amendment by interpreting the word "seizure" to signify "intentional"
conduct. 318 The question arose as to how to evaluate less culpable conduct, that is, conduct that was reckless or grossly negligent.
U.S. 1027 (1988); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (Fourth Amendment
applies while arrestee was "in the custody of the arresting officers"); but see Titran v. Ackman,
893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (Fourteenth Amendment, not Fourth Amendment, applies
to force used after the booking process).
312. 111 s. Ct. 1547 (1991).
313. /d. at 1550.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. In addition, the Court was willing to protect the right to personal security by labeling
"touching" a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Id. Under this view, the Fourth Amendment
would permit citizens to bring multiple claims under the Fourth Amendment for each application of physical force that was "unreasonable."
The concepts of multiple seizures and a continuing arrest, however, do not clarify the
scope of the Fourth Amendment because the concepts are subject to conflicting interpretations. For example, some courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply to multiple
claims only if each event would constitute an independent seizure. See, e.g., Wilkins v. May,
872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (court rejected concept of a "continuing seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment applied to the officers' pointing of a gun at a
suspect's head during custodial interrogation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); see also
supra text accompanying notes 169-72. On the other hand, some courts have interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to apply not only to a single seizure but also to all conduct after the
seizure to determine if the conduct was "reasonable." See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
317. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of this

case.
318. /d. at 596-97.
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Some Supreme Court decisions suggested that such conduct could
constitute a "constitutional tort" under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment and its applications to police
shootings. The Supreme Court has repeated1y affirmed that the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
governmental officials from violating citizens' civil liberties. 319 In defining the scope of protected civil liberties, the Supreme Court in Daniels v.
Williams 320 and Davidson v. Cannon 321 held that negligence was not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Daniels Court based its
conclusion on its interpretation of the word "deprivation" in the Fourteenth Amendment and its view of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 322 The Court interpreted the word "deprivation" to signify an
"abuse of power" 323 and stated that the amendment was designed to "secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. " 324 In rejecting negligence as a basis for a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the Court distinguished a "constitutional tort" from
a state tort. It recognized that the Constitution does not necessarily duplicate the tort remedy available under state law. It did not dictate that
conduct actionable under tort law is not actionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It instead required more culpable conduct than negligence
to state a violation of the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explicitly left open the question whether
gross negligence and recklessness would be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 325
The Supreme Court also suggested in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department ofSocial Services that governmental officials could be
liable under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment for harm that they cause. 326 Although the DeShaney Court
determined that there is no general duty to protect the public from harm
caused by third parties, it did imply that when official actions makes citi319. See, e.g., Zinennon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
contains a substantive [due process] component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful governmental actions...."); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
199-200 (1989) (officials have a constitutional duty to protect individuals in custody from
harm); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (Although negligence is not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, gross negligence and recklessness may be.).
320. 474 u.s. 327, 332-33.
321. 474 u.s. 344, 348 (1986).
322. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
323. ld. at 330, 332.
324. ld. at 326-27 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank
of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244 (1819))).
325. Id. at 334.
326. 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).
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zens "more vulnerable" to harm, then governmental officials may be liable for the harm that they themselves create. 327
In recognizing substantive due process as a basis for infringements
of the right to personal security, the Court thus clarified that both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are possible sources for scrutinizing the conduct of officials. The Graham decision, however, expressed a
preference for analyzing claims of "seized" individuals under the Fourth
Amendment because it is an "explicit textual source ... of constitutional
protection.'ms The Court labeled the Fourth Amendment as a "primary
source of constitutional protection.'' 329 The Court's narrow interpretations of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," however, limited application of the Amendment. Although the amendment would
seem to apply to most conduct between police officers and citizens because it addresses "unreasonable" conduct, the Court in Brower imposed
a requirement that officers act intentionally in order to effectuate a
seizure of a person. Courts that find reckless or grossly negligent shooting to constitute a "constitutional tort," however, have looked to the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis of recovery, even after the Court's
decision in Graham. In contrast, those courts that believe that the
Brower court struck the proper balance between a constitutional tort and
an ordinary tort have refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to
accidental shootings.
Even though the task of distinguishing a constitutional tort from a
state tort can be extraordinarily difficult, this task when placed in the
context of police shootings is less complex.

IV. Resuscitating the Terry Definition in the Context of
Shootings by Police Officers
The Fourth Amendment allows courts to scrutinize various police
practices to determine whether they are "reasonable.'' 330 This authority
is contingent upon whether the challenged conduct was also a "search"
or "seizure.'' Articulating the boundaries of conduct that constitutes a
Fourth Amendment "seizure" has been a difficult task for the Supreme
Court as well as the lower courts. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
become so fact-specific that it is hard to know if a prior decision is prece327. Id.
328. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
329. Id. at 394.
330. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (Court
found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment the use of roadblocks to inspect drivers for
signs of intoxication).
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dent or totally irrelevant to a particular case. 331 In the context of police
shootings, however, bright-lines are not only possible but desirable. Resuscitating the spirit of Terry v. Ohio would allow courts to scrutinize
whether officers act reasonably when they use their guns as a "show of
authority." The justification for application of this definition to police
shooting lies in the Court's historic approach to balancing interests under
the Fourth Amendment. Although the greatest defect of balancing is its
unpredictable outcome, the Court's more recent justifications of reliance
on the common law and dictionaries are similarly unpredictable. Balancing, however, has the added benefit of allowing courts to utilize policy to
shape the contours of the Fourth Amendment.
The task of defining what kind of conduct constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" begins with the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Textualism, however, "creates new problems of its own"332 because a
text "is not self-interpreting."333 The Supreme Court, however, has embraced textualism as a method of limiting the application of various
amendments, sometimes reaching peculiar conclusions. 334
In defining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," the
Court in California v. Hodari D. examined both old and modern dictionaries. It summarized all the different uses of the word "seizure" in a
331. In examining a variety of police practices, the Court has not clarified whether a particular seizure definition applies only to the facts of that case or is applicable in other contexts.
Harmonizing the Supreme Court's seizure definitions is difficult. For example, in Hodari D.
the Court in dicta suggested that "mere touching" could constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure, but in Brower v. County of Inyo, the Court suggested that the force must be used
intentionally. Similarly, the Hodari Court did not seem to require that the officer require
physical control over the suspect if officers used physical force, but the Brower Court based its
physical force definition on the "acquisition of physical control." In addition, one never
knows whether these definitions apply only to foot chases and roadblocks.
332. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 53.
333. Id.
334. For example, the Court has studied the words "punishment" in the Eighth Amendment, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991), "deprivation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 333-35 (1986), and "seizure" in the Fourth
Amendment. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51 (1991). The Court has proclaimed that the word "punishment" not only signifies "deliberate indifference" if the claim
involved the serious medical needs of prisoners or prison conditions, Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), but also signifies "malicious" conduct if the claim is based on the use of
excessive force by prison officials. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992). In interpreting the word "punishment," the Court failed to understand that it was merely interpreting
the word from its own perspective. See generally Schanck, supra note 74, at 831 ("Judges will
continue to interpret texts and will do so in accord with their deeply embedded assumptions,
which include their commonly held jurisprudential and judicial interpretive constructs."). The
Court nevertheless declared, "(t]he source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of
this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment."
Seiter, Ill S. Ct. at 2325 (emphasis in original).
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short phrase: the word means "taking possession."335 This definition,
however, does not distinguish between the act of seizing an object from
the act of seizing a person, a distinction that the Court had previously
recognized. 336 The Court's reliance on dictionaries is misplaced because
"the majestic generalities of the [F]ourth [A]mendment itself suggest that
the Framers were writing for the ages-that they were dealing with concepts, not conceptions." 337 For example, this general language has allowed courts to scrutinize modem police practices of using airplanes, 338
beepers, 339 drug tests, 340 electronic devices, 341 and helicopters342-practices not in existence at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted. 343
Complex legal issues arising under the Fourth Amendment thus should
not be mechanically resolved by relying on a definition specified in a particular dictionary.
Reliance on the common law as a means of interpreting the Fourth
Amendment has also been an unsound guidepost for the Court. 344 In
many situations the Court has adopted the common law in its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 345 other times it has rejected the com335. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICfiONARY 510 (6th ed.
1856); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICfiONARY 2057 (1981)).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interestO").
337. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 7, at 55 (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 134-36, 226 (1977)). Reliance on the language of the Fourth Amendment is also
misplaced because "the actual language of the [F]ourth [A]mendment appears to have been the
product of a back room maneuver that resulted in Congress' adoption of a provision that it had
soundly defeated earlier and never consciously endorsed." Id. at 56-57 (citing NELSON B.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 101-02 (1937)).
338. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-39 (1986) (aerial
photography); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (aerial surveillance).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713-18 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983); see also Note, Mark C. Rohdert, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1461 (1977) ("The beeper is a miniature,
battery-powered radio transmitter that emits recurrent signals at a set frequency.").
340. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989) (drug tests); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618-23 (1989)
(drug and alcohol tests).
341. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971) (radio transmitter); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967) (recording device).
342. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989).
343. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)) ("[The Court] 'has not simply frozen into constitutional
law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's
passage.' ").
344. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1976) (common law on warrantless arrests); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 114 (1975) (detention without a
warrant).
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mon law because of technological changes, 346 and sometimes the Court
explicitly adopted only limited aspects of the common law view for its
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 347 In California v. Hodari D.,
the Supreme Court both adopted and rejected common law views in defining a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Under the common law a police
officer may at times act unlawfully in merely touching suspects or attempting to arrest them. In defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court declared that a touching could constitute a Fourth
Amendment "seizure," but that an attempted arrest was not a
"seizure. " 348
Resolution of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure"
should lie ultimately in balancing, 349 not in the use of dictionaries and
selective application of the common law. The Terry Court recognized
that the amendment was designed for courts to strike a balance between
the government's interest in law enforcement and a citizen's interest in
personal security. In creating the concept of a Fourth Amendment
"stop,'' the Court found no justification in the language of the Fourth
Amendment. It instead balanced the need to recognize what most citizens would find an acceptable police practice against an individual's interest in personal security. For example, the language of the Fourth
Amendment did not cause the Court to create a reasonable suspicion
standard to justify a Fourth Amendment "stop." It also did not clearly
indicate to the Court that the word "seizure" included both the concept
of a stop and an arrest, but not an "encounter." The Court created these
three categories as it balanced the intrusiveness of police practices against
a citizen's freedom of movement. The Court evaluated numerous practices: asking a suspect to answer questions, 350 keeping a plane ticket from
a boarding passenger, 351 following a pedestrian in a car, 352 and establish346. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) ("[R]eliance on the common law rule in
this case [concerning a shooting] would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a
historical inquiry.").
347. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51 (1991).
348. In adopting a portion of the common law, the Court stated that it was "expand[ing]"
the meaning of a Fourth Amendment "seizure." /d. at 1550 n.2. The "expansion[,]" however,
was limited only to the use of physical force, not to the assertion of authority. /d. at 1550.
349. Professor Wayne LaFave recognized the importance of balancing when determining
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." LaFave, supra note 28, at 742. He explained, "If not every ... intrusion constitutes a seizure, then certainly in making the policy
judgment as to precisely where the constitutional line should be drawn, account may be taken
of both (i) the degree of intrusiveness of a particular practice and (ii) the degree of public
benefit if that practice is free of the usual Fourth Amendment restraints." /d. (emphasis in
original).
350. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980).
351. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-501 (1983).
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ing a roadblock. 353 Narrow "seizure" definitions, derived from dictionaries and selective application of the common law, however, preclude
courts from analyzing modem police practices and the circumstances in
which they occur.
In the context of police shootings, a "show of authority," as first
articulated by the Terry Court should be sufficient to implicate the
Fourth Amendment because it represents a standard that properly recognizes the need to subject police practices to scrutiny under the Fourth
Amendment. To the extent that other "seizure" definitions conflict with
the concept of a "show of authority," they should be limited to their
specific facts, which is a common aspect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, or rejected as unsound.
With Terry as the standard for analyzing police shooting, courts
should also apply the Mendenhall definition and its progeny to the extent
that they define what constitutes a Terry "show of authority." Because
the Hodari D. decision did not interpret what constituted a "show of
authority," courts should not apply it to police shootings. The Court's
newly added restriction to the Mendenhall definition, compliance with
the ''show of authority," would produce bizarre results in the context of
police shootings. If courts were to apply the new restriction, the Fourth
Amendment would not be implicated when police officers shoot their
guns as long as they missed their targets. The risks associated with guns
are too obvious to allow such a practice to evade constitutional scrutiny.
The Brower3 54 definition also creates numerous problems when applied to police shootings. The greatest difficulty is the Brower requirement that a seizure be "intentional." Such a requirement allows reckless
shootings to evade review if one focuses solely on the act of shooting and
not the conduct preceding the shooting. 355 In addition, it creates disagreements as to whether the Court requires objective intent to stop a
suspect or an objective intent to harm.
Applying the "show of authority" definition to police shootings allows courts to determine whether the use of a weapon implicates a citizen's right to personal security. A determination that the use of a
weapon constituted a "show of authority" does not, however, mean that
the officer has violated a citizen's Fourth Amendment right to personal
security. A violation only occurs if the use of the weapon was "unrea352. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574-76 (1988).
353. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,451-53 (1990); Brower v. County
oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1989).
354. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 154-92, 216-42, 261-70.
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sonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In determining
whether the seizure was reasonable, the Court has considered the seriousness of the alleged offense, whether the suspect was resisting apprehension, and whether the suspect's escape would "pose[ ] an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others...." 356 In short, a police
practice is reasonable if it properly balances the need for apprehension
against the infringement of bo.dily integrity.
Balancing to resolve both whether there was a Fourth Amendment
"seizure" and whether a police practice was reasonable may seem confusing. Professor LaFave, however, has justified balancing to determine
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure."357 He explains that if
not all intrusions constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then balancing is necessary to delineate "precisely where the constitutional line
should be drawn. 358 Balancing interests to define a Fourth Amendment
"seizure" is different from balancing to assess unreasonableness. At the
core of the first issue is the role of the courts in monitoring police practices. A determination that a practice implicates a person's right to personal security allows the court to consider the reasonableness of the
challenged practice. A decision that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated leaves only the states to subject challenged practices to scrutiny.
Because some states, however, provide police officers with immunity for
discretionary acts committed during the scope of their employment, 359
review by state courts may never occur. The dangerous act of shooting
at citizens thus requires scrutiny by courts under the Fourth
Amendment.

V. Application of the "Show of Authority" Definition to the
Use of Weapons by Police Officers
In the context of "accidental" shootings, application of the "show of
authority" standard would allow courts to evaluate some situations in
356. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1985). In Garner, the Supreme Court recognized that the officers should not use their
weapons to kill all fleeing suspects:
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical hann, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape,
and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.
Jd. See also, Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 248-54 (1991).
357. LaFave, supra note 28, at 742.
358. !d.
359. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LoRIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 26-27 (1991).
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which police officers use their weapons. Police officers use their weapons
in a variety of manners: they carry them holstered, withdraw them, keep
them out while handcuffing suspects, cock them, fire warning shots, and
fire at objects, such as lights and vehicles, and at suspects. When considering "accidental shootings," some courts determine that the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated because they focus exclusively on the last
use of a gun: a shooting. If courts would consider the prior actions of
the police, such as the act of holding a gun at a suspect's head, they could
determine the Fourth Amendment applicable because such an act would
constitute a "show of authority." Before a violation of the Fourth
Amendment could be found, the challenged action would have to be
judged "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, the doctrine of standing360 would limit the class of individuals who could bring claims against police officers for their "show of authority" because the doctrine requires plaintiffs to establish an injury,
whether physical or psychological. 361
Courts should adopt a bright-line rule: withdrawal of a gun is a
Fourth Amendment seizure when it causes physical or psychological
360. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1991) ("at the
core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff 'allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.") (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-13 (1983)) (standing issue applies to each request for relief, whether
for damages or injunctive relief).
361. The Supreme Court recently discussed the type ofinjury necessary to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S.
CaNST. amend. VIII; Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992). The Court stated,
"[t]he Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use
of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' " I d. (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986), (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))). If
prisoners do not have to allege more than de minimis injuries, then suspects injured during an
investigation or an arrest should not have to allege greater harm. See, e.g., Elliot v. Thomas,
937 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1991) (the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 (1989), suggests that there is no significant injury requirement for a Fourth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992); Note, Excessive Force Claims: Is Significant
Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non to Proving a Fourth Amendment Violation, 58 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 739, 759 (1990) ("significant injury requirement runs contrary to the Fourth Amendment"). One Justice also stated that psychological injuries are also actionable. Hudson, 112 S.
Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.
1990) (guard put a gun in an inmate's mouth and threatened to shoot)) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
309 (1990); see also Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v.
Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988) (In analyzing a substantive due process claim the
court emphasized that a " 'state is not free to inflict ... pains without cause just so long as it is
careful to leave no marks.'")); Brief for The United States at 8-9, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment should apply if an officer unjustifiably terrorized a suspect
with an empty gun.).
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harm. In the alternative, subsequent uses of a gun, such as cocking it,
firing it, issuing warning shots, or shooting at people, should also be considered "seizures." Application of the "show of authority" definition to
some common shooting situations reveals how the Fourth Amendment
should be implicated.
The mere presence of a gun on a police officer is insufficient to constitute a "show of authority" under Terry because of the doctrine of "encounters."362 Under this doctrine, police officers may ask citizens a few
questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 363 Because officers generally have their weapons holstered as they approach citizens,
asking a few questions does not implicate citizens' right to personal security. The holstered weapon is simply a part of the uniform.
Withdrawing a weapon, however, should implicate the Fourth
Amendment when this "show of authority" causes harm, whether physical or psychological. Although many dispute the boundaries of permissible encounters, when police officers withdraw their weapons there is an
obvious assertion of authority. In articulating factors that aid courts in
determining what constitutes a "seizure," the Mendenhall Court stated
that one factor was "the display of a weapon by a [police] officer."364
Although the Court did not explain what it meant by "display,"365 the
act of withdrawing a gun is an unmistakable escalation of power during a
confrontation between an officer and a citizen. The act increases the likelihood that someone, whether the suspect, the officer, or a bystander, will
be injured by the gun. This act by a police officer should be sufficient to
constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure."
The focus of Fourth Amendment "seizure" analysis should be on
the dangerous act of withdrawing a weapon, an act that makes a weapon
not only more accessible to a police officer but also sometimes more accessible to a suspect. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has focused
on the suspect's response to an assertion of authority, sometimes evaluating the response from the suspect's viewpoint and sometimes from a reasonable person's viewpoint. 366 The act of withdrawing a gun is an
362. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (No seizure occurred when officers with
holstered guns approached suspects and asked them questions.).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
364. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S 544, 554 (1980).
365. See generally Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2384, 2387-88 (1991) (Court suggested to the lower court on remand that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a
suspect carrying a gun in "a recognizable zipper pouch.").
366. In California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991), the Supreme Court stated
that a "show of authority" alone is insufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure."
It focused on the suspect's actual response to the assertion of authority, a footchase between
the officer and the suspect. It stated that a "seizure" occurs only when the suspect stops in
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assertion of power that is markedly different from the act of questioning
a suspect, of examining identification, or of following a suspect. In these
latter contexts, focusing on how a reasonable person would respond or
how the suspect in fact did respond is a part of any court's struggle to
define actions that implicate the Fourth Amendment, and those that do
not. The act of withdrawing a gun, however, is an act that clearly signifies that a suspect is involved with a governmental actor, an act that in no
way resembles ordinary discourse with other citizens.
By determining that this action constitutes a Fourth Amendment
"seizure," courts would then proceed to examine the justification for this
action. This view of the Fourth Amendment is consistent with the factspecific jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 367 For example, in the
context of arresting suspects in their homes, they have scrutinized each
action by a police officer to determine whether it complied with the
Fourth Amendment. They have evaluated a police officer's authority to
enter, 368 to search the suspect, 369 to search the area near the suspect/70
to examine other rooms, 371 and to stay in the home. 372 Although these
situations implicate the Fourth Amendment because they involve
searches, the Court has used all the circumstances of the search process
to explain reduced levels of justification by a police officers for their actions. 373 In short, the Court has examined each action in relationship to
other actions. If withdrawing a weapon were considered a Fourth
Amendment "seizure," then each use of the weapon after this act could
response to the assertion of authority. Id. In contrast, in Mendenhall and its progeny the
Court attempted to define the line between a Fourth Amendment stop and an encounter. See
supra text accompanying notes 48-76. The Court questioned whether a "reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Under this
definition the suspect need not stop in response to the officer's conduct in order to implicate
the Fourth Amendment.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 48-76.
368. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-22 (1981) (search warrant necessary to enter third-party's home to arrest suspect); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03
(1980) (arrest warrant is necessary to enter home of suspect).
369. See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (per curiam) (search preceding an
arrest can not be used to provide probable cause to justify the arrest).
370. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (police officer may search
"the area into which an arrestee might ... grab a weapon or evidentiary items").
371. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990) (protective sweep of area
permissible if officers have reasonable suspicion that another may be present in the area and
that this person poses a danger to officers or others), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 1011 (1991).
372. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (after fire of home is extinguished, re-entry to search for evidence of arson is impermissible under some circumstances).
373. See, e.g., Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1098 (protective sweep requires only reasonable suspicion,
not probable cause); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (search incident
to an arrest does not require any independent belief of harm or of items of evidentiary value).
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also be scrutinized to determine whether it was "reasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Even if the act of withdrawing a gun were not a Fourth Amendment
"seizure, once an officer attempts to handcuff a suspect, a "seizure" has
occurred under any definition that a court may use. Because the Fourth
Amendment has been implicated, courts should then evaluate whether
the use of a weapon during the process was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This approach is similar to the court's
approach when considering each aspect of an officer's conduct during a
search.
In the alternative, even if the act of withdrawing a gun and using it
to maintain control during an arrest were not a "seizure," the cocking of
a gun must be a "seizure" because this action dramatically increases the
likelihood of an injury. Although a subsequent firing of a gun may be
unintentional, the act of cocking a gun is a deliberate act. The consequences of this action are potentially lethal. In contrast to annoying
questioning by police officers, this act signifies not only potential bodily
injury, but also potential psychological harm. This assertion of authority
by police officers is like the practice the Supreme Court considered in
Terry. It is a practice necessary for effective law enforcement, yet it requires special justification for it to be constitutional. Determining that
the act of cocking a gun constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure"
would allow courts to evaluate the circumstances confronting officers
when they decide to use a potentially lethal weapon.
The act of intentionally firing a warning shot should also be a
Fourth Amendment "seizure" because this action can present even
greater risks than the actions that precede it. The danger of the warning
shot is dependent upon the likelihood of individuals near the area of
shooting. A shot fired during daylight in an open field as a police officer
attempts to apprehend a suspect is quite different from firing a warning
shot at night in a congested area. Although the officer may not have
intended to injure a third-party or even the suspect, the firing creates an
serious risk.
Similarly, when police officers intentionally shoot at vehicles, their
conduct should constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure," regardless of
whether the suspect stops in response to the show of authority or
whether a bullet injures a suspect or passenger. Shooting at a moving
target is a dramatic assertion of authority, one that may deprive citizens
of their lives.
When evaluating police shootings of vehicles, some courts, however,
have imposed numerous restrictions on what constitutes a Fourth
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Amendment "seizure." They have determined that no "seizure" occurs
when the suspect continues to flee or when a known passenger is injured
by mistak.e. 374 Under this narrow view, application of the Fourth
Amendment is directly related to the skill level of the shooting police
officers: the more skilled they are in shooting, the more likely the Fourth
Amendment applies; if police officers lack skill and miss their targets,
then the Fourth Amendment is not applicable. This narrow view fails to
account for the inherent risk in all shootings and likelihood of serious
harm arising from poor training. In addition, under the narrow view of a
Fourth Amendment "seizure," no local governmental entity could be
held liable for its failure to train police officers in the use of deadly weapons because a predicate to this liability is a determination that an officer
who shot his weapon violated the Fourth Amendment. Yet, before a
violation of the Fourth Amendment can be found, a court must first determine that the officer effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure."
A determination that an intentional shooting of a weapon constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" is built upon the need to balance
the interest in personal security against the need to subject this dangerous police practice to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Few citizens would contend that a police officer should be able to fire multiple
rounds at a suspect's car if the officer believes that the driver has just
stolen a candy bar. A narrow view of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," such as the one suggested in Brower would not allow
courts to subject this practice to scrutiny.
By considering the different ways officers use their weapons, courts
would be able to examine the reasonableness of the acts preceding an
"accidental shooting." By using the "show of authority" standard for
Fourth Amendment "seizures," courts would not need to determine
whether the officer intended to stop a suspect or to harm the injured
persons. They would also not need to define the relationship between the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment when the shooting injury occurs
during an arrest or shortly after it. Additionally, the suspect's response
to the assertion of authority would be irrelevant. In the context of police
shootings, a "show of authority" standard creates a bright-line rule, one
that compels officers to evaluate the reasonableness of withdrawing a
weapon in the same manner that they consider the reasonableness of
other actions they take during investigations and arrests.
Once an officer has effected a Fourth Amendment "seizure," then a
jury will determine the reasonableness of the use of a weapon. At this
374. See supra text accompanying notes 149, 261-70.
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stage, the Supreme Court has articulated factors to assist juries in this
determination. 375

Conclusion
Courts have disagreed as to how to evaluate "accidental" shootings
by police officers under the Fourth Amendment. Central to the disagreement is a court's interpretation of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
"seizure." In applying the Supreme Court's three "seizure" definitions in
Terry, Mendenhall, and Brower, some courts have concluded that an "accidental" shooting, even one that results in death, cannot be a Fourth
Amendment "seizure." These courts have erroneously focused on the
last act committed by the officer-the "accidental" shot. By looking at
the actions that precede the shooting, courts can discern how the Fourth
Amendment is implicated when police officers withdraw their guns.
Withdrawal of the gun is a "show of authority" and thus a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" under Terry v. Ohio. Courts should renew the vitality of Terry by applying it to the context of police shootings.
To determine what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure," the
Court has implicitly balanced the interest of subjecting a police practice
to constitutional scrutiny against the state's interest in law enforcement.
Balancing is necessary in order to protect the right to personal security.
While citizens want a law enforcement agency to protect them from
criminals, they do not want their right to personal security undermined
by the police practice that is supposed to protect them. When police
officers engage in "encounters" by asking citizens a few brief questions,
the law enforcement interest in crime prevention and detection clearly
outweighs the de minimis intrusion. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, and police officers may engage in this practice
without being subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, when police officers withdraw and use weapons during their investigations and arrests, the right to personal security is implicated because
of the inherent danger present.
Police officers may cause two types of injury when they use their
weapons during investigations and arrests: physical injuries and psychological injuries. These injuries may occur regardless of whether the injured person stops in response to the assertion of authority. The
Supreme Court's examination of other police practices such as questioning suspects, following them, or chasing them on foot has implicated the
Fourth Amendment only when a suspect actually stops in response to an
375. See supra text accompanying notes 119-290.
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assertion of authority or when officers intentionally use physical force to
stop the suspect. These restrictions have no place in evaluating the police
practice of using weapons during investigations and arrests. The factspecific nature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has logically evolved
from assessing the intrusiveness of various police practices. The deliberate act of withdrawing a weapon during an investigation significantly increases the intrusiveness of the meeting between officers and suspects.
Determining that the Fourth Amendment is implicated does not
necessarily mean that an officer has violated the Fourth Amendment by
the withdrawal of a weapon, a common action in policing. A violation of
the Fourth Amendment occurs only if the withdrawal or subsequent use
of a gun was "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 376
This second determination does not require courts to automatically
exonerate all officers from liability, nor to automatically impose liability
for negligent shootings. In Graham v. Connor, 377 the Supreme Court articulated factors to aid courts in determining whether the use of force
was unreasonable: the "severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight." 378 Although the Court did not indicate the weight of these factors, in Tennessee v. Garner, 379 the Supreme Court expressly stated that
police officers may not shoot suspects just because they are attempting to
evade capture. The Court declared, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape." 380
This determination does not require courts to decide whether the
officers acted negligently, grossly negligent, recklessly, or intentionally.
Nor does it allow courts to create a per se rule that officers may always
withdraw their weapons during investigations and arrests. Assessing reasonableness is a function of the alleged crime committed and an objective
officers' assessment of the danger present in confrontation with a particular suspect. Unless society is prepared to believe that all suspects are
armed, the use of weapons by police officers is dependent upon the partie376. See, e.g., Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir.
1985) ("We perceive nothing improper if an officer conducting a search for narcotics under a
valid search warrant enters the room to be searched with her gun drawn."), cert. denied, 474
u.s. 1054 (1986).
377. 490 u.s. 386 (1989).
378. Id. at 396.
379. 471 u.s. 11 (1985).
380. Id. at 11.
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ular circumstances confronting them. This fact-specific inquiry is what
protects a citizen's right to personal security.
Whether a shooting was intended or just an "accident," the Fourth
Amendment is implicated because the acts prior to the shooting constituted a "show of authority." By focusing on these acts, courts may assess whether the police were reasonable within meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The inherent danger presented by the use of weapons,
whether by the police or by suspects, is the core of the reasonableness
inquiry. This inquiry allows police officers to use their weapons only
when suspects present a danger to police officers or others. It properly
protects suspects, bystanders, and police officers from unjustified
shootings.

